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Abstract 
This study is made up of four essays on technology, culture, and citizenship. 
While there are overlapping themes and concerns amongst all the chapters, each 
chapter also stands on its own. Taken together, they explore the complicated and under-
examined connections amongst these three concepts. Chapter One, “Queering the 
Master’s Tools,” explores the ways in which queer strategies of technological 
appropriation simultaneously serve as means of expressing identity, of resisting its 
reification, and of refusing the option of cultural homogenization. In the second essay, 
“Pink Triangulations,” I investigate the relationship between heterotopic space, queer 
identity, and mobile communications technology. My third chapter, “Freedom Devices,” 
examines issues of power, technology, and governance through the lens of Information 
and Communication Technologies, or ICTs. The last essay, “New Visiblities” examines 
emerging forms of data-driven distributed surveillance. Emphasizing the proliferation 
of surveillance technologies and practices throughout U.S. culture, I argue that the 
prevailing explanatory narrative for surveillance – the Big Brother narrative from 
George Orwell’s 1984 – is outdated, inadequate, and misleading in its framing of the 
nature and role of surveillance 
Above all, these essays seek to understand technology through the lens of culture. 
As a primary site where reality is constituted, it is culture – through language and 
representation – that teaches us what is true or not, what is real or not, and what is 
possible or not. It also helps us understand the roles and manifestations of 
technoscience today. Too often technology, like science and medicine, has been 
approached as apolitical, ahistorical, and non-symbolic – as a “true material base 
generating our merely symbolic superstructure” (Treichler 1999, p. 15). But given the 
symbolic’s privileged position as our gateway to the real, the representation of 
technologies in popular culture is amongst the most significant of these forces: it is 
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where meanings are introduced, contested, stabilized, or challenged. To examine the 
cultural life of a technology is to gain a more accurate and more robust understanding 
of the function and significance of these artifacts and practices, as well as the 
sociotechnical and technocultural systems within which they are embedded. 
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Introduction 
Technocultures and Assemblages 
As its title suggests, this study is made up of four essays on technology, culture, 
and citizenship. While there are overlapping themes and concerns amongst all the 
chapters, each chapter also stands on its own. Taken together, they explore the 
complicated and under-examined connections amongst these three concepts.  
In this introduction, I identify central scholarly concepts, significant arguments, 
and working understandings that inform my own work as well as broader 
contemporary discussions of culture, technologies, and their associations with 
citizenship. While this study represents a range of my scholarly interests, an underlying 
preoccupation is the potentially rich and largely unexploited interchange between 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and queer sexuality. I will use both material and 
non-material examples to demonstrate the strategies through which queer people have 
appropriated and repurposed technologies originally designed and marketed for a 
heteronormative population. Using the iPhone, the female condom, and other 
technologies as examples, I not only seek to interrogate the seductive rubric and broad 
cultural range of “freedom devices” but also to demonstrate the need, significance, and 
potential of the field of queer technology studies.  
Any study of technology must develop workable concepts and definitions of 
terms in this unruly universe. The same can of course be said of culture and citizenship. 
Given that many efforts toward definition and interpretation exist with respect to each 
of these fields, I have tried to cite representative approaches wherever relevant. What is 
original in my study is the challenge to conventional definitions and understandings 
within the interdisciplinary constellation I have indicated: technology, culture, 
sexuality, and citizenship. 
2 
 
 
Central to this study, concerned as it is with the constitution and conditions of 
citizenship, are the notions of “queer,” “queer theory,” and “queering.” These are terms 
that arrive with heavy baggage – baggage that is perhaps neither essential nor useful to 
unpack. Yet because I use queering and queer sexuality repeatedly in these chapters as 
touchstones to examine the changing and often problematic criteria for “citizenship,” a 
few remarks are in order. In Crip Theory, Robert McCruer acknowledges the contested 
origins of “queer theory” (2006, p. 33). He cites critical theorist Teresa de Lauretis’ 1991 
definition of what she called “queer theory” as a new academic field emerging from 
studies of the construction of sexuality and sexual marginalization. Queer theory, in de 
Lauretis’ view, asks how sexualities have been variously conceived and materialized in 
multiple cultural locations and seeks “to articulate the terms in which lesbian and gay 
sexualities may be understood and imaged as forms of resistance to cultural 
homogenization” (1991, p. iii). This homogenization is caustically defined by writer and 
activist Audre Lorde in Sister Outsider as “the mythical norm” (2007, p. 116). McRuer, 
arguing for parallels between queer theory and “crip theory,” his term for his own 
reframing of disability studies, takes issue with De Lauretis’ separation of theory in the 
academy from activism in the street. He offers the “curb cut” as an activist and 
theoretically-informed crip technology in which disability activists used sledgehammers 
to physically dislodge pieces of curb so that wheelchairs would gain access and mobility. 
The action made visible the systemic discrimination underlying “compulsory able-
bodiedness” – another “mythical norm.” “Crip theory,” writes McRuer, contests but does 
not repudiate material identities, at the same time “[takes] seriously the critique of 
identity that has animated other progressive theoretical concepts” (2006, p. 35). In 
contrast, McRuer suggests, queer theory “seeks to dematerialize …identity” (2006, p. 35). 
I take issue with this judgment of queer theory. My study makes clear that 
material identities play a crucial role in the queering process, in both its theory and its 
practice. At the same time, I appreciate McRuer’s insight that the curb cut highlights the 
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paradoxes of identity that crip theory embodies and is highly relevant to my notion of 
queering technology: “If from one perspective that chunk of concrete [dislodged by 
activists] marks a material and seemingly insurmountable barrier, from another it 
marks the will to remake the material world” (2006, p. 35). 
In the context of technology and culture, I consider queering to encompass 
approaches, strategies, and interventions that decenter conventional wisdom about 
technology and foreground issues of culture and, inevitably, sexuality. With queering’s 
complex history and web of connotation, sex and sexuality are inescapable elements of 
any definition. Throughout this study, I describe and discuss cases and examples of 
technologies involving sex and sexuality and the strategies of queer appropriation. As 
we shall see, the process of queer appropriation may target use, meaning, access, 
authorization, and/or the techniques and logistics of appropriation. Such processes may 
require and reflect individual will and ingenuity, collective goals, and solidarity of 
purpose. This is what my first two chapters describe and analyze. Yet there is a larger 
context, as well. The next two essays (Chapters Three and Four) seek to contextualize the 
arguments of the first two by considering the structures and imperatives of 
neoliberalism, postmodernity, governmentality, and citizenship. 
Chapter One, “Queering the Master’s Tools,” explores the ways in which queer 
strategies of technological appropriation simultaneously serve as means of expressing 
identity, of resisting its reification, and of refusing the option of cultural 
homogenization. Looking specifically at the case of the “female” condom and its 
adoption by gay male users, I trace the ways that heteronormativity was from the first 
scripted into the female condom’s design and the ways that “queering” its uses 
challenges that normativity.  
In the second essay, “Pink Triangulations,” I investigate the relationship between 
heterotopic space, queer identity, and mobile communications technology. Heterotopia, 
according to Michel Foucault (1986), is a concept in human geography to describe places 
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and spaces that function in non-hegemonic situations: they are spaces of otherness, 
material and mental, “neither here nor there.” With the proliferation of smartphones, a 
number of applications now facilitate romantic or sexual encounters between gay and 
bisexual men using the geolocative capabilities of the device. Foremost among these is 
Grindr, an app released in 2009. Other similar apps target different groups of users, but I 
shall concentrate on Grindr as an exemplar of novel technological and cultural “dating” 
practices that offer something like a heterotopia. I look at the implications of this 
particular technology in terms of reconfiguring queer spatiality, both for its users and 
for the broader culture, both queer and straight. 
My third chapter, “Freedom Devices,” examines issues of power, technology, and 
governance through the lens of Information and Communication Technologies, or ICTs. 
Looking at the discursive linkage between mobile ICTs and neoliberal configurations of 
liberty, the chapter argues that devices like cell phones have come to play a central role 
in the construction of the “free” subjects of neoliberalism. By situating these 
technologies within a broader history of freedom as conceived and constructed within 
liberal political rationality, I am able to more fully analyze the important yet somewhat 
paradoxical role these devices play in contemporary forms of governmental power.  
The last essay, “New Visiblities” examines emerging forms of data-driven 
distributed surveillance. Emphasizing the proliferation of surveillance technologies and 
practices throughout U.S. culture, I argue that the prevailing explanatory narrative for 
surveillance – the Big Brother narrative from George Orwell’s 1984 – is outdated, 
inadequate, and misleading in its framing of the nature and role of surveillance. While 
seductive, the Big Brother mythology is inadequate to capture the ways in which new 
modes of surveillance operate within contemporary structures of power and 
governance. Despite this, it remains the dominant explanatory narrative for 
contemporary surveillance regimes. An alternative narrative, however, from which Big 
Brother is absent, is in some ways even more ominous. 
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Each of these chapters aims to integrate the study of technology with the 
concerns of culture. The significance of culture in our relationships to technology has 
been neglected in virtually all areas of scholarship on technology. By introducing 
questions of meaning, representation, identity, and narrative into my examination of 
particular technological artifacts and practices, I seek to bring the concerns of cultural 
studies to bear upon technology as well as the conceptual frameworks of technoculture 
and assemblage. 
Today’s newspapers dedicate sections to politics, culture, finance, and – ever 
more commonly – technology. Under this heading are news and features on 
smartphones, carbon nanotubes, stem cell therapies, and artificial turf: each is distinct 
from the others yet all are related within the nebulous category of "technology." AS 
Following the organizational logic of contemporary journalism, we might legitimately 
deduce that technologies, as Stephen Kline points out, are those devices and practices – 
typically electronic and increasingly digital – that are not found in nature but are 
designed and manufactured by humans: laptops, plastics, tempered glass, light 
dimmers, pace makers, sex toys, in vitro fertilization, robots, antidepressants, and so on 
(1985, p. 215). This orientation foregrounds the "thingness" of technologies, a framework 
described by Jennifer D. Slack and J. MacGregor Wise under which  
technological objects are understood to be constructed, solid, and 
nonliving… stable masses, that is, particular arrangements of matter that 
can be described in terms of their mass (large, small, heavy, light, soft, 
hard, dense, and so on). Technologies are artifacts, instruments, tools, 
machines, structures, and things. In this sense, they are discrete, isolatable 
objects, correlates of natural objects, but not natural. (2005, p. 96) 
When framed as discrete phenomena, even as objects, technologies appear to 
exist separately from culture. One consequence of this conceptual split is the belief that 
technologies are autonomous, neutral, and possessing of an intrinsic non-social and 
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non-cultural developmental logic. Such a deterministic approach suggests that 
technologies possess an inevitable and accelerating evolution, that they have strong 
effects on the people who use them and the cultures in which they are embedded, and 
that the inertia and inevitability of technological progress makes these artifacts and 
practices resistant to the intervention of human agents. Separating the technological 
from the cultural realm in this way marks technology as immune from other forces 
shaping contemporary life. This is the hallmark of technological determinism. 
But if we've learned anything from STS, it's that we should not – and indeed 
cannot – think of technology in isolation from the social or cultural. From this 
scholarship have emerged theories of technology including the social construction of 
technology (SCOT) (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999) and 
actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour 2005) that repudiate technological determinism 
and seek to provide accounts of the complex relationship between technology and 
society. These STS analyses, among others, argue and seek to demonstrate that any 
artifact or practice we might refer to as a “technology” is, in fact, a complex and dynamic 
sociotechnical construction that implicates myriad agents in its functioning. Yet STS 
rarely theorizes technologies as expressions or constituent elements of culture. The 
field, as Anne Balsamo points out, has left it to humanists to "extend this analysis by 
noting that every technology also involves the expression of cultural understandings in 
the form of narratives, myths, values, and truth claims” (2011, p. 9). 
This humanist imperative is best reflected in scholarship conducted under the 
rubric of cultural studies of technology. In her account of the intersection of feminism 
and STS, Maureen McNeil points out that as a cultural discourse, technoscience largely 
evaded the critical gaze of cultural studies until the 1980s at which point the cultures of 
technology emerged as increasingly compelling objects of interest for cultural studies 
scholars (2007, p. 19). Accordingly, there are now practitioners of cultural studies who 
examine technology through a critical, humanistic lens – though few have taken it up in 
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any systematic or sustained way. The study of what Andrew Ross and Constance Penley 
have named “technoculture” is a significant scholarly pursuit, especially in an era 
characterized by the rapid proliferation of new, transformative technological artifacts 
and practices (1991). Cultural studies of technology brings cultural studies’ concerns to 
bear upon the production, representation, and circulation of technology, interrogating 
the meanings and images that become attached to technological practices and artifacts 
and the ways in which these phenomena come to be represented throughout culture as 
inevitable, even “natural.”  
What can the study of meaning and representation contribute to our 
understanding of technoculture? As Stuart Hall asks, in the context of HIV/AIDS, 
Against the urgency of people dying in the streets, what in God's name is 
the point of cultural studies? What is the point of the study of 
representations, if there is no response to the question of what you say to 
someone who wants to know if they should take a drug and if that means 
they'll die two days later or a few months earlier? (2001, pp. 284-285) 
What relevance do meaning and representation have within a system in which 
technology and science appear to determine the health, safety, and prosperity of a 
population? Is it even ethical to subject such crucial discourses to critical evaluation lest 
such a practice delay or prevent progressive technoscientific intervention into the lives 
of people here and around the world? But because technoscience holds a “social, 
cultural and politically privileged relation to what is ‘true’ and ‘universal’” (Menser & 
Aronowitz, 1996, p. 8), to interrogate technoscience is to take on the under-explored 
assumptions, beliefs, and values that lie at the core of post-industrial societies. To 
pursue a cultural studies of technology isn’t merely to study one cultural discourse 
amongst countless others. On the contrary, to submit technoscience to the scrutiny of 
cultural studies is to critically interrogate one of the most powerful forces shaping 
contemporary life. 
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But what specifically can cultural studies contribute to the very real, material 
problems that technoscience is tasked with solving? As Paula Treichler argues in How to 
Have Theory in an Epidemic, her examination of the cultural production of HIV and 
AIDS, cultural representation is one of the primary ways through which we access and 
come to understand the nature of the “real” world. Investigating these representations, 
these cultural constructions of reality, is vital to making sense of technoscience: 
To speak of AIDS as a linguistic construction that acquires meaning only 
in relation to networks of given signifying practices may seem politically 
and pragmatically dubious, like philosophizing in the middle of a war 
zone. But… making sense of AIDS compels us to address questions of 
signification and representation….Language is not a substitute for reality; 
it is one of the most significant ways we know reality, experience it, and 
articulate it (1999, p. 4). 
To produce informed and productive insights into a technoscientific 
phenomenon like AIDS requires not only that we understand the medical, scientific, and 
technological “facts” about the syndrome – how the HIV virus operates, what drugs limit 
its reproduction, the physiological mechanisms of transmission—but also that we 
understand how these facts are produced, reproduced, circulated, and mediated 
through the cultural systems of language, representation, citation practices, and visual 
imagery. Without such understandings we remain blind to the ways in which HIV and 
AIDS figure in the real lives of real people and ultimately can develop only partial 
interventions in the eradication of the disease. What scholarship like Treichler’s 
demonstrates is that the reach, strength, authority, and discursive influence of 
technoscience require us to reject its neglect in humanistic scholarship and instead 
establish a rigorous program of critical interrogation targeted directly at the cultural 
discourses that shape our understandings of these artifacts, practices, and phenomena. 
In other words, because of the immense significance of technoscience we can no longer 
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afford to allow its creators and practitioners – physicians, scientists, engineers, and 
technology specialists – to dictate the terms through which we understand these 
phenomena. Cultural studies of technology attempts to challenge the control of 
established experts over meaning, definition, and representation. Cultural studies does 
not oppose technoscience but rather seeks to develop and refine culturally informed 
understandings of technoscientific artifacts and practices: that is, to seek and strive for a 
“democratic technoculture.” This is how Stuart Hall answers the questions he posed in 
the passage quoted above:  
AIDS is indeed a more complex and displaced question than just people 
dying out there. The question of AIDS is an extremely important terrain of 
struggle and contestation. In addition to the people we know who are 
dying, or have died, or will, there are the many people dying who are 
never spoken of. How could we say that the question of AIDS is not also a 
question of who gets represented and who does not? AIDS is the site at 
which the advance of sexual politics is being rolled back. It’s a site at which 
not only people will die, but desire and pleasure will also die if certain 
metaphors do not survive, or survive in the wrong way. Unless we operate 
in this tension, we don’t know what cultural studies can do, can’t, can 
never do, but also, what is has to do, what it alone as a privileged capacity 
to do (2001, pp. 284-285). 
In Designing Culture, Balsamo argues for the conscious and deliberate inclusion 
of cultural knowledge and concerns from the very beginning of the process of 
technological development. “Culture,” she writes, "needs to be taken seriously in the 
practice of technological innovation” (2011, p. 5). For Balsamo, technologies are 
inherently cultural artifacts, inextricably connected to the systems of meaning that 
constitute culture. By overlooking or inadequately addressing the cultural effects and 
embeddedness of technologies, we risk misunderstanding the role and consequence of 
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those things that, by "reconfiguring the spaces of possibility for the formation of social 
relationships, as well as for the production of human life," have not "simply rearranged 
the technological infrastructure of human life," but "have reconfigured what it means to 
be human” (2011, p. 4). 
For Balsamo, technologies are not discrete entities with clearly delimited 
boundaries; rather, the artifacts we refer to as "technologies" are constituent parts of 
countless webs of phenomena – material and immaterial; people as well as objects; 
things as well as feelings, attitudes and beliefs – that come together to produce our 
experience of technology. She argues that technologies “are not really things, but are 
better understood as assemblages of practices, materialities, and affordances” (2011, p. 
8). By using “assemblages” as a framework, Balsamo draws attention to technology’s 
interrelations with other phenomena. As I indicate below, I also draw on the notions of 
assimilation and articulation. 
Jennifer Slack and Greg Wise, communications and cultural studies scholars, 
argue similarly for a more radically integrated notion of technology and culture. 
Drawing from Raymond Williams's axiom that culture entails “a whole way of life” 
(2011, p. 55), Slack and Wise argue that “technologies are integral to culture, not 
separate from it” (2005, pp. 4-5). In line with Balsamo, Slack and Wise add the concept of 
“articulation” to “assemblage” to understand the ways in which technologies become 
contingently linked to other processes, constructs, experiences, and effects. These 
networks of articulation, they argue, are frequently understood as the context of 
technology. But Slack and Wise point out that the framework of articulation makes clear 
“that context, or culture, is not something ‘out there’ out of which technology emerges or 
into which it is put. Rather, the particular articulations that constitute a technology are 
its context” (2005, pp. 128-129). Technologies are not “things” embedded within 
complex networks of articulation; rather, those things which we refer to as technologies 
are constituted by the very articulations in which they are said to be embedded.  
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So what does this say about the materiality of technology? Are the physical forms 
technology takes not relevant to the ways it is taken up, circulated, and understood? 
Deborah G. Johnson, professor of applied ethics at the University of Virginia, writes that 
“artifacts have particular (hard, nonmalleable) design features and whatever their 
cultural meaning, the design of the artifact can itself have an influence on social 
behavior” (2010, p. 40). It is important, then, that we not ignore the materiality of 
technology; but neither should we privilege it. Johnson suggests that many approaches 
to technology focus on the artifact while others focus on sociotechnical system. But 
Slack and Wise reject the division between system and artifact, arguing that “the 
‘thingness’ of a technology is only one aspect of what it is. The rest of what it is can only 
be understood by describing the nature of connections within which it is developed and 
used” (2005, p. 109). This emphasizes that technologies are not artifacts embedded in 
networks of interrelations but rather themselves networks of interrelations of which the 
materiality of the artifact is just one element, understandable only through the 
aggregation of these connections.  
This formulation asks us to think about technologies in new ways and, more 
significantly, to actually rethink the referent indexed by the signifier “technology.” 
Instead of discrete objects or practices, technology, as Slack and Wise define it, more 
accurately refers to that which emerges from the network of interconnections amongst 
artifacts, people, and the countless social and cultural elements articulated with them. 
Consider how we treat the idea of the “Internet.” We conceptualize and treat it in 
everyday language and behavior as a “thing” — and yet it is not a thing: the signifier 
“Internet” describes a state of affairs brought into being from the interconnections 
amongst billions of networked computing devices. “Internet” is also the experience of 
that network of interconnections, the intangible phenomenon that the network 
manifests. We might point to a web page and say, “Here is the Internet,” but that is 
inaccurate; the web browser is just one way in which we access and experience 
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“Internet.” Similarly, when we equate a technology as a discrete artifact – a shoe, let’s say 
– we let the physical boundaries of the shoe demarcate its conceptual borders, its uses 
and meanings. But our experience and understanding of “shoe” is not inherent in the 
artifact, but emerges from the network of contingent elements that constitute it. “Shoe” 
isn’t the thing on your foot; the thing on your foot is a material element in the system of 
interrelations that constitute “shoe,” a material point of entry into an experience that we 
can refer to as “technology.” Within this framework, the borders between technology 
and culture become increasingly porous and flexible. The meanings of the shoe – its 
gendering, “style,” appropriateness for a given social event or location, price, 
composition, and niche in the fashion world – are as much part of the shoe as an 
assemblage as are the leather and rubber from which it is made. Following the 
arguments of Balsamo, as well as Slack and Wise, for a radical integration of culture into 
our understanding of technology. As these authors demonstrate, technologies are not 
static material objects but ever-shifting assemblages of material and meaning. I am 
arguing that there is no technology and culture; instead, all culture is technoculture.  
The framework of the assemblage offers a productive way of integrating cultural 
concerns into the study of technology. Like other concepts I use here, the framework of 
assemblage seeks to track the movement and influence of ideas, things, technologies, 
and words throughout societies and cultures. Most significantly, an assemblage enables 
and encourages social analysis situated across social scales and levels: in other words, it 
encompasses both micro-data (concerning individuals) and macro-data (e.g., society as a 
whole) – and even the sub-individual and the transnational. To suggest the usefulness of 
this approach, I will briefly examine a specific technology to show how transformations 
amongst its constitutive elements have important effects for the users of the 
technologies and for the broader cultures linked to it. 
Grindr is a smartphone application designed for gay and bisexual men that 
allows them to orchestrate romantic or sexual encounters. Focusing on technology as an 
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assemblage means that we see Grindr not only as a software application that runs on 
mobile ICTs but also as an artifact constituted by the myriad connections and 
interrelations amongst the countless elements that, in the aggregate, produce a coherent 
artifact and experience for the user. These include material elements – the handset, the 
wires, chips, and transistors within it, the bodies of the users – as well as immaterial 
elements – behavioral conventions and norms, bodies of knowledge, regulatory systems, 
the economics of personal electronics, and the meanings that get attached to the 
application. What we know as “Grindr” – like what we know as an “iPhone,” a “car,” a 
“shoe,” the “Internet” – is always changing; as Slack and Wise describe it, it is forever 
embroiled in a Deluezian process of “deterritorialization and reterritorialization” by 
which some articulations are broken while others are formed, changing the precise 
nature of the technology (Deleuze and Guattari as quoted in Slack & Wise, 2005, p. 131). 
Deterritorialization occurs when existing linkages within an assemblage are broken, 
consequently altering the material and immaterial nature of a technology. The 
deregulation of the telephone system, for example, can be seen as an example of 
deterritorialization insofar as the change in the relationship between telephone 
companies and the state resulted in an alteration to the way people understood and 
interacted with telephones. Reterritorialization, in contrast, is when new connections or 
linkages are articulated within a technological assemblage. The introduction of 
perpetual Internet connectivity to mobile phones is an example of reterritorialization. 
The new capabilities offered by these devices had consequences for their regulation, 
their consumption, their status as artifacts of popular culture, and even their very 
material form. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization occur perpetually, meaning 
that what a technology “is” will vary greatly over time, place, and user as its constituent 
articulations are repeatedly and reformed. 
But while the meaning of a technology – a phone, for example – will change 
greatly over time, the field of articulations to which a technology lays claim possesses a 
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certain recalcitrance to change. While technological assemblages are forever subject to 
the transformative dynamics just noted, they also exhibit a tenacity that allows us to see 
the rotary phone and the iPhone as conceptually and materially similar while also 
recognizing them as fundamentally different. They vary in the affordances they provide 
their users, in their materiality, and in the social and cultural functions they perform, 
yet both can be said to fall within a broader category of “phone.” Viewing technologies as 
assemblages enables us to understand how technologies can be dynamic, unstable, and 
resistant to transformation. 
While it is through the interconnection of these diverse elements that a 
technology becomes coherent and usable, coherence doesn’t necessarily imply stability. 
Regarding a technology as an assemblage allows us to more clearly see its dynamic and 
continuous changes amongst the various articulations that constitute it. Approaching 
Grindr as an assemblage allows us to examine the experiences of individual gay men, its 
place within the genre of “dating” or “hook-up” sites, its role as entrepreneurship, its 
contribution to the local and global economy, and its cultural significance. Thus the 
emergence of a technology like Grindr elicits and describes a moment of transformation 
in the dynamics of gay sexual culture. Articulations that once existed amongst 
meanings, practices, and objects are being challenged, broken, and reformed with 
potentially significant consequences.  
Although Grindr is used by only a small population of smartphone owners, its 
cultural visibility extends beyond its gay and bisexual user base. As a hook-up app used 
by gay men to arrange anonymous sexual rendezvous, Grindr has achieved no small 
degree of notoriety within mainstream culture. In many ways, Grindr has become the 
punchline to the joke that is the mainstream reading of gay culture. And as a punchline 
it feeds into the mainstream’s construction of gay culture as vacuous, shallow, and sex-
obsessed. The attention directed towards Grindr therefore brings heightened 
mainstream scrutiny of gay sexual culture and intensifies the effect of heteronormative 
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evaluations of gay culture. To this end, one of the possible consequences of Grindr’s 
mainstreaming is the transformation and suppression of gay sexual culture, turning the 
app into yet another showcase by which gay sexuality is denigrated and policed. 
Consider the negative framing of Grindr in a 2010 episode of Law & Order: SVU 
centered on a smartphone application much like Grindr (Storer 2010). Titled “Quickie,” 
the episode features a straight male sexual predator who orchestrates anonymous hook-
ups with the explicit goal of infecting unsuspecting women with HIV. Several elements 
of the narrative highlight the unfavorable construction of gay sexuality by mainstream 
culture. Although they exist, straight equivalents of Grindr have not become the popular 
sites that “Quickie” suggests, nor have such sites gained cultural traction or publicity in 
any way comparable to Grindr. Despite the history of real life crime associated with 
heterosexual dating sites (including craigslist), Law & Order’s storyline required swift, 
hedonistic, and essentially anonymous heterosexual contacts. This was apparently best 
achieved by embedding a gay technology into a straight storyline. By creating a villain 
who symbolically mimics gay sexual practices (like cruising), uses a gay cultural artifact 
(like Grindr), and is transmitting a virus most stereotypically associated with gay sex, 
Law & Order reveals a hidden (or not so hidden) anxiety about the damaging influence 
of gay sexual culture on the straight world. Even worse, this symbolically gay villain 
causes the death of innocent women. Taken as a whole, the episode is certainly a 
commentary on the threat – the lethal threat – that gay sexuality is perceived to pose to 
normative straight sexual culture. So while the villain is not literally gay, Grindr is never 
explicitly mentioned, and there is no informed discussion of the popularity of such apps 
among gay men, the “Quickie” episode conveys a troubling normative critique of gay 
sexual culture. 
The framing of technology-enabled “anonymous” sex as inherently risky and its 
users as either cruel (the perpetrators) or stupid (the victims) champions a model of 
heteronormativity in which sex is something properly conducted only within the 
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framework of the monogamous dyad in the privacy of the domestic bedroom. And even 
though Law & Order’s narrative centered upon straight characters, it clearly functions as 
a commentary on the “reckless” and “dangerous” sexuality of the people who actually 
partake in practices like this, namely gay men. Not only is the gay sexuality that gave 
rise to practices like cruising and services like Grindr suppressed and condemned by 
such discourses, its negative representation of gay sexuality and identity raises again the 
shibboleths that were so destructive in the first decade of the AIDS epidemic.  
The mainstreaming of a gay cultural artifact like Grindr potentially 
reterritorializes it in ways that threaten the perceived value of practices like cruising, 
practices that are vital to the maintenance of an oppositional queer sexual culture. 
Although Grindr embodies a novel constellation of technical affordances in using 
emerging geolocative and communication capabilities, it also changes the articulations 
among gay sexuality, mainstream culture, and material artifacts. This is perhaps 
Grindr’s main significance. Considering Grindr within the framework of assemblage 
allows us to see how the individual interacts with a novel technology, at the same time 
suggesting how changes to one element of the assemblage can have ripple effects upon 
the other constitutive elements, ultimately transforming the ways in which the 
technology is used, what it means to the users, and how it intersects with other cultural 
configurations. For many individuals, Grindr is a freely chosen software application that 
promises pleasure, fulfills desire, and operates within a like-minded subculture. Yet the 
crude shorthand of the “Quickie” episode that casts anonymous gay sexuality as bad, 
dirty, risky, and immoral raises the possibility that Grindr may lead a double life as a 
mechanism of surveillance. 
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Chapter One 
Queering the Master’s Tools: Appropriating Technology 
Critics of prevailing approaches to technology studies argue that as “effective as 
existing approaches to the study of technology are for understanding technological 
developments by members of dominant cultures in Western society,” they have proved 
inadequate in capturing the “wide variety of technological experiences that fall outside 
of the realm of dominant cultural experiences” (Fouché 2006, p. 642). From this 
perspective, a number of scholars seek to bring new perspectives to the study of 
technology that are sensitive to the specific relationships to technology of groups that 
fall outside of the mainstream. As Rayvon Fouché argues, the prevailing methodologies 
within science and technology studies (STS) including the systems approach, social 
construction of technology (SCOT), and actor-network theory have proven to be unable 
to account for the relationships marginalized population have with technologies and 
technological systems: 
The acknowledgment of the margins, and those activities, people, and 
institutions that exist and thrive there, are fully absent from all of these 
approaches, because they consistently focus on winners of technological 
controversies and why certain technology has won (2006, p. 647). 
Just as feminist critics bring attention to the significance of gender in shaping and 
using technology, as well as its neglect in such fields as STS, sexuality is similarly 
neglected.1 Even though sexuality constitutes one of the dominant organizing logics of 
contemporary culture, little work examines the relationship between sexuality and 
technology. Indeed, STS rarely engages with the problem of sexual identity or the other 
issues of identity politics that have transformed scholarship in other fields. Nor has 
attention been given to the experience of technology by queer people. This chapter 
                                                
1 For extended discussions of feminist technology studies see Wajcman 2004 and Boyer, Vostral, 
& Layne, 2010. 
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begins an effort to theorize the relationship between queerness and technology. As with 
Fouché’s examination of race and technology, exploring the strategies of technological 
use by queer populations promises to further our grasp on the “complexity and 
contradiction in technology and societies” (2006, p. 650). 
As I noted in my introduction, Audre Lorde’s declaration furnishes the title for 
this chapter: “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” (2007, p. 
110). While often interpreted as a proclamation of defeat or resignation in the face of 
patriarchal dominance, Lorde’s argument can also be read as a manifesto against 
resignation: defeat can and must be overcome by embracing difference, making 
common cause with other marginalized subjects, and refusing to accept the Master’s 
House as the only place to live. Using several examples of appropriated technology, I 
explore the legitimacy of this reading. 
But I do not deny the power of the Master’s house. While perhaps less stable than 
it once was, the sex/gender system outlined by Gayle Rubin in her influential 1975 
essay, “The Traffic In Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex” remains a 
powerful organizing framework for U.S. society and animates a near-universal 
assumption of heterosexuality (1975). As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes in The 
Epistemology of the Closet,  
Vibrantly resonant as the image of the closet is for many modern 
oppressions, it is indicative for homophobia in a way it cannot be for other 
oppressions. Racism, for instance, is based on a stigma that is visible in all 
but exceptional cases… so are the oppressions based on gender, age, size, 
physical handicap (2008, p. 75). 
Gay and lesbian identities are invisible in ways that many other types of 
stigmatized identity are not. Cast as a trait inherent to the individual, queerness is 
unmarked on the body and requires conspicuous revealing in order to be made visible. 
Coming out of the closet is the performance of this trait to others. The presumption of 
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straightness obligates gays and lesbians to publicly announce their stigmatized, 
invisible, identities to be acknowledged. While typically framed as a cathartic ritual of 
self-acceptance, in actuality coming out of the closet is performed for the benefit of the 
dominant straight culture. This act positions the queer self within the social and cultural 
landscape as a particular type of “other.” The decision to leave the closet doesn’t so much 
reflect an internal struggle or even a struggle between the individual and family and 
close friends. Rather, akin to Butler’s notion of gender performance (1993), coming out 
of the closet is a performance that both describes and materializes a cluster of social 
relations between the gay or lesbian person and the dominant straight culture itself. 
Coming out is not an act gays and lesbians have to perform just once: it is a 
process that requires persistent performance and lifelong reassertion within the 
prevailing culture of presumed heterosexuality. That being queer requires these acts of 
continued public revelation reflects the ways that queerness, as Sedgwick posits, is 
largely invisible and unmarked on the body. Further, the significance of coming out of 
the closet in the constitution of queer identities – the requirement to reiterate one’s 
status as queer in order to maintain it – illustrates how queer identities are non-
material as other identities are not. Ultimately, too, the invisible and non-material 
nature of queer identity shapes the relationship between queer people and technology. 
Analyses of technology frequently emphasize the materiality of the artifact and 
the processes of design and production that led to their material development. But 
technologies are not simply material artifacts, and relying too heavily on design and 
production as a site of critique of technology reinforces the neglect of distribution, 
representation, and consumption. Further, as Slack and Wise point out, focusing on the 
materiality of technology potentially “deflects vision toward the tool-like use of these 
things, and away from the work or role of these things beyond matters of their 
usefulness” (2005, p. 97). This material bias suggests that technology is pliable and 
amenable only during its design and production phases and that forever afterward it 
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remains static, stable, and resistant to change. In contrast, if technology is regarded as an 
assemblage constituted of dynamic interrelations between material and immaterial 
elements, then the range of possible interventions is radically expanded to include the 
ways in which people consume and interpret a technology in addition to how it is 
produced. 
Approaching technology as an assemblage displaces the artifact from the center 
of our analysis and allows the various meanings, knowledges, and beliefs to emerge as 
sites of both evaluation and intervention. Further, since the production of the material 
technology is no longer disproportionately prioritized, we gain a better understanding 
of the ways that a technology is determined as much by how it is used, consumed, and 
interpreted – that is, how it is cultural – as it is by how it is designed and produced.  
This perspective opens up the possibility for queer technology and queer 
technological critique. Since the otherness characterized by queerness is materially 
invisible and requires labor to establish and maintain, a queer evaluation of technology 
needs to be leveled as much at its non-material significations as at its material form. A 
queer approach, focused on artifacts as assemblages, examines the non-material 
elements that constitute technologies: the meanings, knowledges, truths, values, and 
significations that come to be linked with a given material artifact. A queer technology 
invokes the symbols, cultural practices, spaces, identities, meanings, and modes of social 
organization that reflect the culture and experiences of queer individuals. But 
technologies are designed at sites of traditional social power and as such embody the 
values and beliefs of mainstream heteronormativity. In contrast, queer uses of 
technology rely on strategic modes of consumption and interpretation that can recast 
once normative technologies as oppositional. 
The practices carried out by gays and lesbians serve to create and deploy 
technology to suit their particular needs can be examined through the lens of 
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appropriation.2 Technological appropriation allows queer users to take up pre-existing 
technologies and use them to their own ends, often by relying on immateriality of the 
technology in the form of its cultural significations. In this way, strategies of queer 
technological appropriation “begin with production at the usual professional locations,” 
but move to a “second phase in which this technoscience is reinterpreted, adapted, or 
reinvented by those outside these centers of power” (Eglash 2004, p. ix). The creation of 
queer technologies often requires actively queering already existing technology through 
appropriation. Indeed, (mis)appropriation – not just of technologies, but of spaces, 
cultural forms, and identities as well – is a central feature of queer life and sensibility. 
This results from the ways that queers have historically been written out of the cultural 
scripts dictating what constitutes normal adult life at multiple levels. The production 
and maintenance of queerness requires active misappropriation and misuse at multiple 
levels. The expression of oppositional queer identities through technological 
appropriation involves creative and strategic interpretation not envisioned in the design 
and production process.  
Ron Eglash, professor of STS at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, delineates a 
hierarchy of technological appropriation: reinterpretation, adaptation, and reinvention 
(2004). Reinterpretation involves a transformation at the semantic level of a technology. 
The form and capacity of the technology remain largely unchanged, but the meanings 
attached to it are challenged and reconfigured in ways that suit the appropriating party. 
Eglash points to graffiti as an example of reinterpretation that transforms the semiotics 
of the structures that get tagged (walls, subway cars, highway overpasses) while their 
form and capacity remain essentially unchanged. Adaptation goes a step further by 
changing the uses of a technology as well as its semantic associations in ways neither 
intended nor foreseen by its designers or producers. Using a technology in novel ways is 
exemplified by Rayvon Fouché’s account of the appropriation of turntable technology 
                                                
2 Appropriation may also describe the appropriation or cooptation of a technology – including a 
queer technology – by hegemonic institutions, but this is a topic for my last two chapters. 
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by African American hip-hop artists, transforming it from a tool for the playback of 
music into one for its production is an example of adaptation (2006). Reinvention, the 
strongest form of appropriation in Eglash’s hierarchy, structurally reconfigures the 
technology to carry out functions it was never designed to perform: “if adaptation can be 
said to require the discovery of a latent function, reinvention can be defined as the 
creation of new functions through structural change” (2004, p. 12). 
While Eglash posits these three modes of appropriation as a hierarchy, I prefer to 
think of them as a spectrum of interventions. A dramatic example is the intervention of 
AIDS and queer activists in the process of developing, testing, approval, and distribution 
of drugs potentially useful in treating HIV disease (AIDS and its clinical spectrum of 
attendant diseases and conditions). A long series of political actions in the late 1980s 
resulted in significant changes in the bureaucratic process and protocols for bringing 
new drugs to market – as well as the reconceptualization of the process (Epstein 1996; 
Treichler 1999). This example of reinvention demonstrates the value of assemblage as 
an analytic framework: the changes brought about to the AIDS drug process involved 
individuals, groups, official bodies and protocols (e.g., the FDA, NIH, and CDC), and 
state and federal oversight regulations. To this inventory of scales and levels of a large 
scale technological apparatus, we could plausibly extend its scope from the “sub-
individual” in the form of internal bodily processes and even microbes to the 
transnational. Assemblages, enabling the examination of components, clearly offer an 
invaluable and useful and approach to so complex a set of social sites and their linkages. 
The AIDS treatment action campaign that reinvented the drug approval process 
was long, complex, and carried out in the midst of intense suffering and death. 
Reinvention is not always so massive an initiative; moreover, it is not necessarily more 
politically significant or effective than reinterpretation and adaptation. Instead, each 
strategy must be evaluated within its immediate cultural and historical context. For 
queer populations, reinterpretation and adaptation have been the most effective means 
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of enacting resistance to “cultural homogenization” through technology. Focusing on 
the materiality of technology privileges the body as the point of interaction between 
subjects and technology. There are no more universal bodily attributes amongst the 
various forms of queer identity than there are amongst gender or race identities; thus 
the diversity of queer bodies cannot be accommodated through changing the material 
form of a technology is rarely going to address the breadth of queer individuals given 
this bodily diversity.  
It is true that designers try to take into account not only the range of material uses 
to which a technology might be put but also the variety of signifying practices that 
circulate around a technology to arrive at a design that is sensitive to the needs and 
desires of the broad range of people who will engage with it (Balsamo 2011). But while 
cultural concerns are not wholly ignored in the process of design, it is a particular set of 
cultural concerns that ultimately are taken into consideration, those of the dominant 
social order. Consequently, the cultures of marginalized groups are rarely taken into 
account when technologies are made. Indeed, by serving the needs of the dominant 
culture, many technologies actually contribute to the oppression of already 
marginalized groups. When making a technological artifact, designers attempt to 
delineate the ideal relationship that will exist between the users and the technology 
(Woolgar 2005, p. 32). In doing so, they establish a set of parameters that predict which 
users will engage with a technology and how, actively configuring an ideal identity for 
future users (Woolgar 1991). This subject position describes a set of personal 
characteristics in addition to prescribing a set of appropriate behaviors and proper uses 
of the technology. As Steve Woolgar points out, users who fall outside these parameters 
– whether because they engage with the device in unexpected ways, veer from the ideal 
user identity, or have unforeseen needs – will be categorized as atypical or even 
unsanctioned (1991, p. 89). It is in this space, as unsanctioned users, that gays and 
lesbians find themselves in relation to certain technologies.  
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Again, medicine provides useful examples. Clinical drug trials, mentioned above, 
were traditionally conducted using white male subjects – the population long regarded 
as the default “norm” for the general population across many fields of biomedical and 
clinical practice. As the rights’ movements of the 1960s and 1970s exploded across the 
country, the medical establishment was challenged on behalf of African Americans, 
women, poor people, and other vulnerable populations. This included people of “non-
normal” size including babies and children: heart transplants from male donors, for 
example, were much too large for most women’s and children’s bodies, as were the 
prototypical artificial hearts (the Jarvik-7, for example, designed by Robert Jarvik and 
implemented in 1982). Many other medical implements, medication dosages, and 
clinical regimes had also not been tested on populations other than white male adults. 
The assumptions made by designers that were in line with the dominant culture had 
dangerous implications for people who had not been imagined as “ideal users.” 
Regardless of the intentions, assumptions, or hopes of the designers, though, 
technologies exhibit interpretive flexibility and people inevitably use and understand 
technologies in unforeseen and even unsanctioned ways. Just because certain identities 
and behaviors are scripted into a technology does not mean that users are obligated to 
conform to this ideal construction or observe the parameters prescribed by the 
technology. Differences between the designer’s conception of the “ideal user” and the 
real life behaviors of the “actual user” illustrate how central user identities are in the 
production and consumption of technology. I will return to this point in my discussion 
Figure 1: The Remington Model 870 Compact Pink Camo shotgun. 
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of the female condom below. This tension enables users to resist the identities scripted 
for them by technology designers and instead use the technology to enact resistance 
(Slack & Wise, 2005, p. 161). By engaging with technologies in unscripted ways, 
oppositional identities reveal and resist the assumptions and beliefs coded into 
technologies.  
But not all “unsanctioned users” follow the path of opposition. The “pinking of 
technologies” refers to attempts by technology companies to appeal to female 
consumers through such highly-feminized design schemes as rhinestones, floral 
ornamentation, and the use of a pink-hued color palette. Exemplary technologies 
include the pink-camouflage shotgun,3 the Tulip E-Go Lifestyle laptop, and Della, a 
2009 web service created by computer maker Dell 
in an attempt to cater to the specific needs of 
women technology consumers – this included 
helpful tips like, “Track your exercise and food 
intake at free online sites like Fitday” (Stern 2009).  
From a feminist perspective, “pinking,” while 
directed at women, by no means represents a 
feminist technology:  
If Sex and the City is right and the powder-compact color-drenched jewel-
adorned cell phone is what women want and reinforces women's goals and 
interests, then I would venture to say that the manufacturers are 
producing a feminist technology. However, if this technology reinforces a 
gender system in which women's aesthetic has been defined by men to suit 
men's interests and are antithetical to women's interest and goals, then the 
designers and manufacturers have certainly not produced a feminist 
                                                
3 As their website explains: “You wanted some ‘wow’ factor for young ladies, and we answered 
with the new 20-gauge Model 870™ Express® Compact in Mossy Oak® Pink Camo” (Remington 
n.d.). 
Figure 2: The Tulip E-Go Lifestyle 
laptop. 
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technology, and indeed may have produced an anti-feminist technology 
(Gorenstein 2005). 
While the pinking of technology offers scripted identities that are deemed 
marginalizing by one group of users (women), they can also be interpreted as resistant 
and oppositional by another group (queers). The aesthetic of pink technologies invokes 
a reductive and stereotyped version of female identity and props up the social structures 
of patriarchy (King 2006). Yet the appropriation of pink technologies by gay men is a 
vehicle for political resistance by upsetting the logic of the sex/gender system. When 
pink technology is appropriated by 
a gay man, he challenges the 
traditional gender conventions of 
its styling. As a material artifact, a 
“pinked” iPhone case, which 
features a pink rose, is 
stereotypically feminine. Such an 
image functions exactly the same 
way that a case plastered with 
images of motorcycles or a 
camouflage print signifies 
masculinity. Regardless of its 
aesthetics, the iPhone case as a material object functions to protect the phone itself. But 
the success of this protective technology depends on more than its materiality. The gay 
man who uses this feminized device expresses a non-normative sexual identity through 
the adoption of a feminized aesthetic. This demonstrates how reinterpretation can be an 
effective form of queer technological appropriation. In this case, the iPhone case 
functions successfully for the gay user at the level of cultural signification: it becomes a 
conduit through which he can symbolically express an oppositional identity. By 
Figure 3: Camouflage and floral iPhone cases. 
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adopting and challenging the gendered significations of pinked technology, gay men are 
able to resist the heterosexist identities and assumptions scripted into the design and 
production of a technological artifact.  
The reinterpretation of pinked technology highlights the fiction of the boundary 
between technology and culture. Materially, the rose case is the same as the camouflage 
case, made of the same polymers, shaped to the same dimensions; materially, the prints 
themselves are the same, made of the same pigments and adhesives. But it is at the level 
of signification – of culture – where they diverge. The rose invokes an entirely different 
constellation of meanings than does the camouflage, and because of this the case is 
“successful” for the gay male user in ways that the camouflage case could not be.  
It is tempting here to divide technology proper from something that can no 
longer be considered technology. When the material transitions into the aesthetic, we 
reach an apparent boundary where the iPhone case becomes something other than 
technology, something simply cultural. But this is a crucial question to ask about any 
technology: what are the meanings it elicits for its users, meanings that shape how it will 
be used and understood? And what are the meanings that come to be articulated to the 
technology, and thus come to constitute it? Here we must add another layer: a 
technology arises not only from its form or function, but also from its status as a symbol. 
All these layers, of course, play into and contribute to a technology’s economic viability. 
Consequently, the image of the rose may turn out to play as a vital role in the success of 
the iPhone case as the polymers it is made of: again, a technology is not limited to its 
physicality but also encompasses the network of articulations – to both tangible and 
intangible phenomena – that constitute it as coherent. 
While the pinked iPhone may not seem politically urgent, the case of the female 
condom demonstrates the serious political and health implications of a gendered 
technology and the potential value of its appropriation for the life and death of queer 
users.  
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In concert with the historian John D’Emilio, Robert McRuer emphasizes the 
profound influence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in revitalizing gay and lesbian activism 
and fuelling “the queer renaissance” (1997, p. 16). AIDS activism moved queer life and 
desire into the public eye, not only by making manifest the realities of systemic 
oppression but also – even in the midst of suffering and death – by flaunting new and 
transgressive identities. The queer renaissance, in other words, acknowledged and made 
visible gay and lesbian identities, refused to apologize for them or assimilate, yet at the 
same time treated them with a certain critical and irreverent eye. 
Steven Epstein (1996) and Paula Treichler (1999), among others, document the 
equally profound influence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on science and technology. I now 
look at a technology brought into being by the AIDS crisis: the female condom. With 
regard to the more familiar “male” condom, Treichler shows that despite social, legal, 
and political obstacles, HIV/AIDS transformed the lowly condom’s status from “lewd 
device to global superstar” (2014). The female condom’s journey has been more 
problematic and ambiguous. 
In the early years of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the U.S., gay men were perceived 
to be its targets. Even as growing numbers of women were identified with HIV or AIDS, 
the Centers for Disease control was reluctant to establish a new category of cases.4 
Attention was instead focused on gay men (though education, prevention, and 
treatment were ad hoc and ad lib – indeed negligent – for quite some time). Scholar and 
activist Gena Corea (1993) describes the troubled and basically fruitless efforts by 
women physicians, nurses, women and lesbian activists, and social service providers to 
direct attention to the many issues concerning women encompassing science, 
treatment, support, and prevention. Prevention turned out to be particularly fraught 
                                                
4 The CDC publishes the weekly Morbidity and Mortality Report, a journal that provides the latest 
AIDS statistics to health departments around the country; only by holding its categories of cases 
stable and consistent from week to week could the progress of the epidemic be gauged. But there 
were many objections to the failure to create a category for women: instead of their own category, 
most involving heterosexual transmission, the CDC assigned them to existing surveillance 
categories including IV drug users, partners of IV drug users, women who are African or Haitian, 
transfusion recipients, and mothers of infants with AIDS. 
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with problems: women, especially 
young women, were focused on birth 
control, not STDs including HIV, and 
were ignorant about the difference 
between oral contraceptives (“the 
pill”) and barrier methods like the 
condom. Once public information 
about condoms took hold, additional 
problems emerged, particularly male 
resistance.5 What was needed then 
was dual protection (against 
conception and disease) that was 
under women’s control and required neither men’s acceptance nor knowledge.  
Enter the female condom, a technology that essentially combines features of the 
diaphragm with those of the male condom. Originally released to the market in 1993, 
the Reality Female Condom – now branded as FC2 (Female Condom 2) following a 
redesign – has been approved by the FDA for “preventing pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, and 
other sexually transmitted infections” (FDA 2009). The first generation of female 
condoms (FC1) were manufactured of polyurethane. The second generation (FC2) are 
made of nitrile (lower cost and less likely to make crinkling noises). This version consists 
of a pouch designed to be inserted into the vagina to act as a physical barrier against the 
transmission of fluids during penetrative sex. Like a diaphragm, it has a stiff rubber ring 
at one end that can maintain its shape and firm positioning against the cervix during 
intercourse; unlike the diaphragm, the opening of the pouch remains outside the 
vagina, protecting the entire vaginal cavity from HIV as well as from conception.  
                                                
5 When condoms were at last permitted to be advertised on television, many ads turned on this 
dynamic: wear a condom or get lost. Growing evidence made clear that such a negotiation would 
be hard enough in the U.S. but virtually impossible for poor women, here and abroad, with little 
economic or legal equality. 
Figure 4: The female condom. 
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The female condom has been on the market for nearly two decades but has yet to 
find widespread appeal among women users in the U.S. Sociologist Lisa Jean Moore 
studied the experiences with the first version of this technology (FC1) among sex-
workers in the Bay Area. For a variety of reasons, they mostly gave the product thumbs 
down: problems included discomfort, unappealing aesthetics, and noise. Some said it 
was typical that a product, ostensibly designed to empower women in sexual 
negotiations, would not have been tested by informed and experienced consumers 
(Moore 1997). 
While currently marketed to straight consumers as a female condom, the makers 
had initially considered gay male users in their design of the product, going so far as to 
set up clinical trials for gay men using the device for anal sex. As these trials began, the 
FDA informed the Female Health Company (the producers of Reality), that use of the 
condom for anal sex would never be approved; obstacles included the number of states 
with sodomy laws still in place as well as the likelihood that Congressional conservatives 
would block any initiative directed at gay men, claiming any such program would 
“encourage homosexuality” (Rotello 1996, p. 72). Faced with the prohibitive cost of 
clinical trials and the larger conservative political climate of the late 1980s, the 
Company abandoned its initial trials and subsequently released Reality as a product for 
women consumers in heterosexual relationships. In 1999 the company introduced FC2, 
the second generation of Reality that was redesigned to be more affordable and thus 
accessible to more users. But despite the continuing numbers of new infections among 
gay men and the Clinton era’s marginally more accepting attitudes toward 
homosexuality, there was still no mention of anal sex in the FDA’s review of the 
improved device (See FDA 1993; Hess 2010). 
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Left to their own devices, gay men in the 
1990s began using The female condom for anal sex, 
even though the product continued to lack FDA 
approval. Also without the FDA’s blessing, AIDS 
organizations and health clinics in San Francisco 
began distributing the device, convinced that for gay 
men unlikely to use “male” condoms, “female” 
condoms, whether officially tested for anal sex or 
not, were better than nothing (Rotello 1996; Scarce 
2004). The lack of easily-accessible information 
about The female condom’s efficacy in preventing 
STD transmission during anal sex meant that gay 
men could only speculate on how best to use the 
device and hope for the best. For these men, using 
the female condom was an act of blind faith. In the 
context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the female 
condom experience offers yet another example of 
the neglect of gay men’s needs, practices, and 
desires.  
Individual users weren’t the only parties to 
suffer from the female condom’s lack of official 
sanction. No official sanction means no official 
information. On the website for Washington D.C.’s 
Department of Health and Human Services is titled 
“Instructions on Using the Female Condom for Anal 
Sex” (District of Columbia Department of Health 
n.d.). Two methods of inserting the device into the 
Figure 5: Instructions for inserting 
and using the female condom 
provided by the Female Health 
Company 
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anus are described along with the familiar condom axiom that only a “water-based 
lubricant” should be used. Oil-based lubricants compromise the integrity of the 
conventional latex condoms and make them more vulnerable to breaking or 
disintegrating. But the female condom is made of nitrile, not latex, and allows the use of 
oil-based lubricants during intercourse—a feature that some users consider an 
advantage over latex condoms. This misinformation is not likely to do major harm: 
water-based lubricants will work perfectly well with nitrile and polypropylene. But it is a 
miscommunication that is potentially confusing and suggests the uncertainties 
surrounding the female condom’s use during sex including anal sex. For many 
technologies, misinformation might not be significant. But in this situation, 
misinformation potentially affects the health of female condom users, including gay 
men. This makes it a far more serious matter. 
It is noteworthy that the traditional “male” condom has been repeatedly subjected 
to efficacy tests, and so have virtually all other forms of sexual protection. Educational 
programs about contraception typically distinguish between “perfect use” and “typical 
use.” An example of perfect or ideal use of a contraceptive device – a condom for 
instance – would be something like a married couple who have two children and at 
present do not want more: usage is planned, careful, and agreed on by both man and 
woman. Throughout the 1980s, AIDS advocates argued that the statistics about 
contraception were hardly applicable to the situation of men infected with – or terrified 
of contracting – a virus that was then viewed as a “death sentence.” In the course of the 
first two decades of the epidemic, multiple studies were carried out on condom use and 
effectiveness for multiple populations in multiple circumstances.  
33 
 
With neither extensive research nor official FDA 
sanction, the female condom is nonetheless being 
promoted as an effective means of STD and HIV 
prevention during anal sex. The Female Health 
Company note in their informational materials on 
Reality that there “has been no research on the 
effectiveness of Reality for anal sex use and it is not 
approved for anal sex use. However, many public 
health organizations confidently promote Reality for 
anal sex” (Female Health Company n.d.). Student health 
organizations at both the University of California at 
Santa Cruz and at Columbia University promote the 
female condom for protection during anal sex (Health 
Services at Columbia n.d.; UCSC Condom Co-Op n.d.). 
In addition, the American College of Physicians 
included instructions on how to use a female condom 
for anal sex in their 2007 publication, Fenway Guide to 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Health, albeit with 
warnings that female condoms had yet to be tested for 
safety or efficacy for use during anal sex  
That female condoms are now being promoted 
as effective preventatives during anal sex by these 
organizations reflects an interesting dynamic in the 
process of technological appropriation. Ron Eglash 
argues that practices of technological appropriation 
often move downward in terms of social power (2004, p. 
ix). That is, technology is produced at a position of high 
Figure 6: Instructions on using a 
female condom for anal sex, 
published by the American 
College of Physicians. 
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social power (e.g., wealthy companies employ highly educated workers). Consumption 
of technology happens throughout society, but appropriation of technology in the form 
of reinterpretation, adaptation, or reinvention typically occurs at sites of low social 
power where users are less likely to be scripted into the technology during its design. 
These may be people who experience other forms of marginalization based on an 
identity of class, race, gender, or sexuality. It is significant, then, that the appropriated 
use of the female condom by gay men – marginalized users with relatively low social 
power in comparison to health industries and such gatekeeping agencies as the FDA – 
has traveled upward, toward entities like the Female Health Company and municipal 
departments of health which now incorporate these unsanctioned uses in their 
informational materials.  
The unsanctioned uptake of the female condom exhibits a strategic mode of 
queer technological adaptation which allows for the expression of non-normative 
identities, sensibilities, and lifestyles. And the queering of the female condom has been 
influential. Yet the lack of official approval and regulation of the device for anal sex has 
serious consequences. The dearth of information about its proper use in anal sex 
drastically raises the stakes for this type of technological appropriation. Mantell et al. 
write that 
The dearth of information on female condom use during anal sex could 
encourage individuals to use the female condom for anal sex, which may 
increase HIV transmission risk or represent a missed opportunity for 
protecting non-condom users. There is a need for a series of safety, 
acceptability, and efficacy studies and, in the interim, for the development 
of a carefully qualified harm-reduction set of guidelines regarding anal 
use of the female condom for health care providers (2009, p. 1185). 
FDA approval of female condoms for anal sex would provide an important form 
of social and cultural legitimacy. But FDA sanction would not be simply symbolic, a 
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move that would seem to validate queer subjects and lifestyles; it would bring with it the 
host of material benefits that accompany such cultural and bureaucratic recognition. It 
could be argued that FDA approval would merely exemplify the assimilation and 
erasure of oppositional queer identities. But formal approval would also advance the 
health of the people using the female condom for anal sex. Official government 
approval would provide visibility that could result in benefits: further funding for 
research, the development of more advanced prophylactics, and heightened awareness 
of the female condom. Despite what I’ve reported here about usage among gay men, 
many don’t know of its existent nor that it can be used to help prevent HIV and STD 
transmission. As it is, the silence of the FDA yet again diminishes the health concerns of 
gay men and quite possibly compromises their health and well-being. By not addressing 
these uses of the female condom, the FDA not only condemns gay men and other 
practitioners of anal sex to continued ignorance about efficacy, they are effectively 
writing them out of the cultural script created by the technology, thus silencing their 
voices and negating their existence. The strategic adaptation of the female condom by 
gay male users as a means of symbolic resistance to heteronormativity should be 
celebrated. But while the appropriation of the female condom by gay men opens up new 
opportunities for pleasure and safety in sexual interactions, it also “represents the latest 
site where gay male sexuality is regulated, scrutinized, negotiated, and technologized” 
(Scarce 2004, p. 75). And, I could add once more, a site where gay men are once more 
neglected by the powers that be. 
Queers have often been written out of technological narratives to their significant 
detriment. But focusing on the ways that queer populations have been subjugated by 
technology denies them agency and overlooks the ways in which these groups have 
deployed technologies to their own ends. In a context in which technology more often 
works against than for them, queer populations have turned to strategic forms of 
technological adaptation as a form of resistance and identity construction. Adaptation 
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challenges both the prescribed semiotics and uses of a technology. In the cases described 
here, gay men took up a technology and rescripted its users and its uses: that these were 
unsanctioned helped transform the meanings of the artifact and changed its more 
general perception.  
Technologies in a heterosexist technoculture are predominantly designed by and 
for straight, gender-conforming individuals. Queers, then, find ways to appropriate and 
adapt existing technologies in ways that serve their specific needs. Queer appropriation 
is not merely a practical matter; it also enables queers to express and enact oppositional 
identities, practices, and ways of living. The queer appropriation of the female condom 
does not simply “make do” with the technologies available to them, assimilating a 
heteronormative technology that conforms to prevailing narratives of “normal” 
sexuality. Rather, queer appropriation confronts coercion, resists coercion, 
acknowledges the seduction of technological artifacts, and challenges the identity of the 
ideal user. This demonstrates how technological appropriation provides a means for 
marginalized populations to oppose the power structures that contribute to their 
oppression. 
Like Fouché’s study of turntable appropriation (2006) or McCruer’s invocation of 
the curb cut (2006), this study claims that appropriations of mainstream heterosexist 
technologies allows queer users to reclaim a social legitimacy and visibility denied 
them. Such use resists and repudiates the heteronormativity to which the device is 
typically linked and which informs its design, production, and marketing. In one sense 
this appropriation of gendered and heterosexist technology is part of a long history of 
necessary appropriations carried out by queer people to express their identity. At the 
same time, the “misuse” of technology is also a deliberate and creative form of symbolic 
and material resistance to the heteronormativity of the dominant straight culture. By 
reinterpreting and adapting cultural and technological artifacts designed for straight 
people, queer populations have managed to articulate a unique and resistant sensibility 
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and identity. The conscious and deliberate flouting of the conventions of 
heteronormativity – in this case from a perspective of unsanctioned misuse of 
technology – creates a space for the articulation of queer identities and lifestyles. 
Certainly gay men embrace a stance of opposition as they explore and test the 
uses of the female condom as a technological tool. For this, they do not require the 
Master’s approval. Yet they also recognize that in this case the Master’s approval has 
very specific value. Official authorization by such federal agencies as the Food and Drug 
Administration and the Public Health Service would make gay men eligible for 
significant benefits including scientific guidance about usage and effectiveness. Official 
authorization would also, like the curb cut, make visible the continuing quest by men 
who have sex with men to devise better technologies for choosing health over disease.  
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Chapter Two 
Pink Triangulations: Queer Heterotopias And Geolocative Technologies 
On east 14th street in Manhattan, half a block west of the pitiless Corbusian 
monoliths of Stuyvesant Town, a black awning extends from an anonymous brick 
building on the south side of the hectic roadway. In white lettering the word “nowhere” 
is written – lower case, sans-serif – and beneath it four crumbling steps descending to a 
doorway. Stenciled across the door are the words “QUEER BAR.” Inside: a jukebox, beer, 
and men. Nowhere is my favorite bar in Manhattan. 
This sentence captures a common experience of queerness: to be afforded a place 
in the world that is “nowhere.” And in this case “nowhere” – the word, not the bar – 
signifies the non-existence of a place even as it evokes a placeless place. “Nowhere” 
evokes a sense of a place that lacks the requisite specificity and meaning to make it 
notable or locatable – it is inadequate, elusive, diminished. These conceptions of 
“nowhere,” often difficult to articulate, touch upon the odd and unstable spaces of 
queerness and the difficulty of trying to identify or find a coherent “queer space.” 
Stigmatized, unstable, and often invisible, queerness is a state that takes effort to 
maintain; its spaces are equally elusive.  
While difficult to articulate spatially, “nowhere” illustrates the entanglement of 
space and being as well as their state of mutual constitution. For while no one can be 
outside space – that is, no one can actually ever be nowhere – the less obvious maxim, as 
put forward by Henri Lefebvre in The Production of Space (1991), is that space requires 
people in order to exist; not as interpreters or embedded actors, but as producers. Space, 
Lefebvre argues, isn’t a neutral backdrop for human action, but is constantly being 
brought into being. Queer space, then, doesn’t simply exist; it manifests through myriad 
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discourses.6 To suggest “queer space is nowhere” is a provocative entry point into a 
broader discussion about queerness, space, and technology that I address in this 
chapter. In particular, “nowhere” suggests that queer space can be linked to Foucault’s 
conception of heterotopia: spaces that exist within a society that are somehow other 
when compared to dominant spatial order. These are spaces that allow for the 
expression of “a radical politics of inversion” (Jones 2009) and challenge the 
heteronormative social order. 
This chapter explores the intersections of three phenomena – space, queerness, 
and mobile technologies. By exploring the effects of their collision, intersection, and 
imbrication, I address a number of questions: What is queer space? Where is it and what 
is it like? How does it come into being? Pursuing these questions provides insight into 
the ways that identity, power, and governance condense around particular subjects, 
technologies, and spaces. Throughout, the idea of queer heterotopias will be used to 
evaluate the current state of queer spaces as they interact with contemporary 
assimilationist politics and the proliferation throughout society of personal media 
technologies. 
“Space,” writes Foucault in the essay “Space, Knowledge, and Power,” “is 
fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of 
power” (2000, p. 361). There is no shortage of ecstatic pronouncements about the re-
emergence of space as a fruitful site for critical scholarship in the humanities and social 
sciences (for example, see Bell & Valentine, 1995; Ingram, Retter, & Bouthillette, 1997; 
and Soja 1989). Many writers celebrate the dismantling of historicism’s dominance and 
the emergent potential of space to engender new and vibrant modes of scholarship. 
While a reluctant geographer, Foucault’s essay “Of Other Spaces” set the agenda for the 
critical social and cultural scholarship on space in the second half of the twentieth 
century (Soja 1989, pp. 16-21). 
                                                
6 For discussions on the production of queer space see Hubbard 2004, Innes 2004, Valentine 2002, 
Oswin 2008, and Conlon 2004. 
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Given as a lecture in 1967, “Of Other Spaces” is where Foucault most explicitly 
considers questions of space. “Of Other Spaces” presents readers with a novel and 
provocative conception of space that made a lasting impact on critical studies in the 
humanities and social sciences. Foucault demonstrates that space has become the 
prevailing paradigm for understanding and ordering the world in Western societies, 
writing that, “We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, 
the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed” (1986, p. 22). If the 
nineteenth century was obsessed with time and history, than the twentieth was 
concerned with orderings, arrangements, and networks.  
Foucault also shows that space is neither a novel nor neutral concern. Instead, 
space has a history, and looking at the nature of space in different societies reveals its 
different conceptions over time. Medieval space was a space of hierarchy and 
emplacement; places were bounded and definite, stable in their relation to all others. 
Galileo, he argues, broke the bounded space of the medieval era, showing through the 
discovery of earth’s orbit around the sun that space was radically open; that a thing’s 
place was fundamentally unstable, a mere point in its endless movement. But in the 
current historical moment, space is neither of these. Instead, contemporary notions of 
space are about arrangement, about the relations between a thing and other things. 
Proximity becomes the important measure of space and the network, the matrix, and 
the grid its visual manifestations.  
Foucault also outlines a conception of space that is neither a neutral backdrop 
against which human action is conducted nor an empty vessel waiting to be filled. 
Rather, space emerges from the lived experience of the myriad social relations that 
constitute life: 
[W]e do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place 
individuals and things… we live inside a set of relations that delineates 
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sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not 
superimposable on one another (1986, p. 23). 
Space, for Foucault, is dynamic and contingent: not an empty stage for human 
action but an emergent phenomenon whose contours are constantly coming into being 
through the particularities of lived experience. To suggest that space and subjects are 
mutually constitutive is a significant claim. In Foucault’s thinking, space comes into 
being through the actions of subjects while simultaneously shaping the nature of its 
occupants. In contrast to common sense notions of space which cast it as neutral 
backdrop for human action, Foucault makes space dynamic, contingent, and 
productive. 
The true significance of Foucault’s essay lies in his identification of spaces of 
otherness that are external to the prevailing social relations that structure and govern 
society. Foucault dubbed these spaces “heterotopias” to mark their otherness from social 
spaces in society at large and to indicate the multiple, often contradictory, meanings 
these spaces take on. They are both real and unreal, physical and imagined, possible and 
impossible. These “places... [are] outside of all places, even though it may be possible to 
indicate their location in reality,” and function as “a kind of effectively enacted utopia in 
which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are 
simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (1986, p. 24). Heterotopias exist in 
relation to the prevailing spatial arrangements of a society. They are spaces of otherness 
that challenge the hegemony of dominant spatial practices and allow for the articulation 
of what is “impossible” in a given society.  
Significantly, in describing heterotopias, Foucault refuses to distinguish between 
the “reality” of physical space and the “unreality” of non-material space: imaginary 
space, religious space, spaces of desire, the space of the symbolic and so on. Heterotopias 
legitimate these spaces and bring them into dialog with existing conceptions of “real” 
space. Our spatial practices materialize these spaces as though they were physical. The 
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lived experience of space inevitably involves the layering of multiple types of space, 
both material and immaterial. For just this reason, heterotopias were long regarded as 
irrelevant – as if they had “been obscured by a bifocal vision that traditionally views 
space as either a mental construct or a physical form – a dual illusion” (Soja 1989, pp. 
17-18). 
Historian George Chauncey highlights the significance of certain places in the 
creation of modern gay identities, communities, and consciousness:  
By the 1890s, gay men had made the Bowery a center of gay life, and by 
the 1920s they had created three distinct gay neighborhood enclaves in 
Greenwich Village, Harlem, and Times Square, each with a different class 
and ethnic character, gay cultural style, and public reputation (1995, pp. 2-
3). 
Elise Chenier points likewise to spaces that have become mythologized in the historical 
narratives of American gayness: “[The Stonewall uprising’s] unwavering popularity 
highlights how bars and other commercial spaces have been essential in the history of 
LGBT communities and cultures” (2004, p. 118). Similarly, James McCourt opens his 
personal narrative of mid-century gay life with a spatial metaphor:  
Queer Street is our Broadway… traversed by seven parallel avenues… and 
on the grid by any number of names, letter and number streets, all out of 
sequence and Oz-like willy-nilly… The convergence of Queer Street – the 
intersection of whatever avenue and any of these cross streets – creates a 
little neighborhood of its own. Other streets terminate in circles… rather 
than cutting all the way across the grid and others still… are hardly more 
than a block long (like Gay Street in the real Village) (2004, pp. 5-6) 
For McCourt, Queer Street is an imaginary street, a non-material site that exists in no 
city and in every city, populated by those sites where gay life was permitted to exist and 
queer sensibilities came into being.  
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Many bars, streets, theaters, and neighborhoods have come to occupy significant 
positions in gay America. Stonewall Inn, the Castro, Fire Island – these are places where 
queer subjectivities were allowed to emerge, and they continue to play an important role 
in our understanding and experience of gay and lesbian life in the U.S. Recounting the 
rash of gay-bashings in Central Park in the late 1970s, Doug Ireland foregrounds the 
importance of those places that permitted the expression of queer sexuality: 
There have always been parts of our city that have served as gay cruising 
areas: Washington Square Park in the 1940s, Third Avenue near the 
Queensboro Bridge in the 1950s, the Soldiers and Sailors Monument at 
89th Street and Riverside Drive in the sixties, piers at the end of 
Christopher Street in Greenwich Village in the seventies. But Central Park 
West, and particularly the Ramble, has retained its popularity for 50 years 
(1978). 
And Fire Island, a sliver of a sandbar off Long Island where gays and lesbians have 
summered for decades, has been described as a “gay Utopia — a place free from traffic, 
straight people, and, to a large extent, technology, where you could meet other men with 
a freedom and spontaneity that were impossible almost anywhere else” (Rogers 2012). 
Without these spaces, queerness could not exist. The unspeakability of 
homosexuality meant that there were few spaces where it didn’t have to be actively 
suppressed. As gay men appropriated these spaces for sex and camaraderie, they 
became refugees from a society that sought their annihilation. These spaces existed as 
their occupants existed: both outside and inside, visible and invisible, real and 
imagined. These queer heterotopias are places of otherness in which the norms of 
sexuality and gender could be suspended with a freedom “impossible almost anywhere 
else.” Queer heterotopias exist “in opposition to heteronormative spaces and are spaces 
where individuals seek to disrupt heterosexist discourses… [and] dislocate the 
normative configurations of sex, gender, and sexuality” (Jones 2009). In this way, queer 
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spaces are other to the dominant heterosexist spatial order. They function as 
heterotopias of crisis and deviance, cordoning off threatening subjects and conduct 
from society at large.  
Why are these sites so important? As Henri Lefebvre reminds us: 
Any “social existence” aspiring or claiming to be “real,” but failing to 
produce its own space, would be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of 
abstraction unable to escape from the ideological or even the “cultural” 
realm. It would fall to the level of folklore and sooner or later disappear 
altogether, thereby immediately losing its identity, its denomination and 
its feeble degree of reality (1991, p. 53). 
It is crucial to understand the significance of certain places in allowing the articulation 
of stigmatized desire, places where a politics of alterity could come into being at all, and 
where, if nothing else, a population risking incarceration, persecution, violence, and 
institutionalization could find refuge. And without the existence of spaces like these in 
the past, a contemporary queer project would not even be coherent: the forms of 
sociality they afforded, the sexual relations they engendered and promoted, and the 
expression of otherness they allowed set the stage for a contemporary queer sensibility 
and still function to provide forums for any number of queer practices and identities. 
Like any subject, queer subjects are the products of their spaces; they come into being as 
subjects as they articulate the very contours and thresholds of the space through and 
from which they materialize. The implication for a gay movement then, – 
assimilationist, liberationist, gay, queer, whichever – is that the coherence and validity 
of their existence is immediately put in question when they can no longer claim a space. 
Indeed, given the co-constitution of space and subject, the disappearance of gay and 
lesbian spaces will mark the disappearance of gays and lesbians as unique cultural and 
social subjects. 
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These sites periodically come under attack. In Times Square Red; Times Square 
Blue, Samuel R. Delany recounts the conversion of Times Square throughout the course 
of the 90s; an important site of cross-class, cross-cultural, and cross-race gay contact and 
free sexual expression became a tourist space dominated by large corporate interests 
(1999). This new real estate scheme forced the closing down or relocation of businesses 
in Times Square that had fostered the creation and survival of gay culture throughout 
the 20th century. Porn theaters, strip clubs, and adult bookstores had long stimulated a 
vibrant culture of public sex to emerge and flourish in New York City. Writing from 
1996-1999, Delany saw the destruction of these places as a loss of a culture and an 
identity. For him, this was an attack on the queer culture that these places nurtured; it 
also reflected a shift in values and tastes among U.S. gays and lesbians toward the 
mainstream.  
Headed by Mayor Rudolph Guiliani, many interested parties drove the 
redevelopment: businessmen and city politicians saw the Times Square clean-up and 
rebuilding as a lucrative source of new revenue; government and corporate elites 
championed the plan on behalf of middle-class citizenry and middle-American tourists; 
and morally righteous citizens themselves regarded the elimination of deviance as a 
boon to urban civic life by remaking the seamy Times Square neighborhood to be safer, 
prettier, and more comfortable. As Delany illustrates, the corporations behind this 
development generated revenue not from charging tenants rent, but – through 
complicated maneuvers involving the creation of child companies, enormous bank 
loans, and the offloading of financial risk onto shareholders – made their money from 
the construction of the towers themselves. Their stake in the future of Times Square as a 
“place” is thus limited; their profit comes in the form of shareholder purchases and any 
revenue made from rent is just an added bonus. What this means, then, is that even 
though this type of business-oriented development is known to hollow out 
neighborhoods, often making for dangerous, inner-city ghost towns, development is 
46 
 
allowed to proceed because of the profit-generating potential of the construction itself 
and the political influence of the property developers (Delany 1999, pp. 149-152). 
Redevelopment rhetoric resonated with heteronormativity: the sex to be had in Times 
Square was the wrong kind of sex among the wrong kind of people.7 Scorn for Times 
Square sex was echoed by groups of mainstream gays and lesbians whose moral outrage 
at such wanton depravity supported the plan to shut the site down.  
The sexual culture of Times Square was seen as a holdout from a pre-AIDS era of 
reckless sexuality emblematic of the worst that gay culture had to offer.8 Further, 
mainstream gay activists viewed the decidedly non-assimilationist values embodied in 
Times Square sexual culture were seen as undermining the agenda of “good” gays and 
lesbians, who prioritized the integration of gays and lesbians into mainstream American 
life through political initiatives like gay marriage. But the transformation of Times 
Square into a family-friendly vacation destination failed to recognize that the loss of 
these theaters and stores would ultimately diminish or destroy important gay 
institutions. Why should they care? Because the Times Square plan displaced or 
destroyed places and people whose groundwork had made it possible for a mainstream 
gay movement to emerge at all. 
The constituency of mainstream gays and lesbians who endorsed the razing of 
Times Square’s sexual culture were operating according to the neoliberal logics of what 
Lisa Duggan dubbed “The New Homonormativity”: 
[Homonormativity] is a politics that does not contest dominant 
heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains 
them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency 
and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and 
                                                
7 For illuminating accounts of why public sex has been vital for queer culture, see Delany’s Times 
Square Red; Times Square Blue and Michael Warner’s The Trouble with Normal. The perception of 
“the wrong kind of sex” is essentially any deviance from what Audre Lorde calls “the mythical 
norm” (2007) – that is, any deviance from the private domestic bedroom of a married man and 
woman. 
8 Similar debates occurred over the move to close down gay bathhouses and nightclubs in the 
early years of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. For opposing views, see Shilts 1987/2007 and Crimp 1987. 
47 
 
consumption... [This is achieved] primarily through a rhetorical 
remapping of public/private boundaries designed to shrink gay public 
spheres and redefine gay equality against the “civil rights agenda” and 
“liberationism,” as access to the institutions of domestic privacy, the “free” 
market, and patriotism (2002, p. 179). 
Rejecting the deviance of earlier queer cultures, the pro-development gay leaders 
sought ideological refuge in the trappings of mainstream heterosexual culture: 
domesticity, monogamy, the nuclear family, and privatized consumption. Under the 
homonormative conception of gayness, the culture of open sexuality embodied by the 
old Times Square was jettisoned in favor of an assimilationist position that would see 
gays and lesbians adopt the practices and institutions of mainstream heterosexuals. 
Further, any notion of gay and lesbian “equality” or “freedom” comes to mean free 
access to markets, freedom to consume, and a domestic privacy in which to lead quiet, 
unobtrusive, lives. The suburbanization of gay and lesbian culture involves the pursuit 
of a mode of life modeled after traditional hegemonic conceptions of home and family 
as depicted in mainstream heterosexual culture. Popular culture, long uneasy with 
stereotypical gays and lesbians, is apparently comfortable with the suburbanized 
version. In such TV series as Modern Family and such films as The Kids are Alright, gays 
and lesbians are shown as members and parents of model nuclear families (Doran 
2013). Overlooked are the queer heteropias that played so central a part in the 
production of contemporary gay and lesbian subjects and the freedoms they now enjoy.  
The emergence of homonormativity has important spatial implications for the 
existence of queer heterotopias. The homonormative impulse isn’t just about razing 
those sites of depraved queer culture: it is also about establishing a new spatial order of 
gayness. While animating the destruction of queer heterotopias, the logics of 
neoliberalism have also reconfigured the domestic home as a suitable and proper space 
for gay and lesbian subjects. Privacy becomes the new spatial order for good 
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homonormative citzens, comfortably containing what were previously deviant bodies. 
“It is privacy,” Martin Manalansan writes, “in all its modulations and inflections, that 
shapes the very ethos of neoliberal homonormative conceptions of freedom” (2005, p. 
151). The push toward privacy displaces the “proper” space of queerness from the parks, 
bars, theaters, and bathhouses of earlier eras into the privatized space of the domestic 
home. 
Queer heterotopias have allowed for the articulation and expression of queer 
desire, identity, sexuality, and sensibility where other spaces suppressed them. They can 
be seen as sites of radical liberatory potential for the deviant subjects who occupy them. 
At the same time, the ascendency of homonormativity is blamed for depoliticizing, 
domesticating, and “anesthetiz[ing] queer communities into passively accepting 
alternative forms of inequality in return for domestic privacy and the freedom to 
consume” (Manalansan 2005, p. 142). 
But before we condemn homonormativity and celebrate heterotopic spaces, we 
need to critically examine their purpose in society. Foucault writes that “each 
heterotopia has a precise and determined function within a society” (1986, p. 25). True, 
queer heterotopias have been productive and empowering spaces for a population 
marginalized by dominant culture. But what is the purpose of these heterotopias for the 
societies which they reflect and in which they are embedded?  
Heterotopias of deviance, Foucault writes, are those “in which individuals whose 
behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed” (1986, p. 25). 
The Ramble in Central Park, Cherry Grove on Fire Island, or any of the bathhouses, porn 
theaters, or sex clubs where gays and lesbians establish places for themselves allow 
deviant subjects to enact their deviant desires. Queer heterotopias house these 
intolerable bodies whenever or wherever their conduct cannot be incorporated into the 
prevailing social order. While they have not been ratified or endorsed as institutional 
heterotopias like prisons or psychiatric hospitals have, queer heterotopias serve a 
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similar function and are permitted to exist in order to protect the rest of society. They 
cordon off and regulate subjects who threaten the social order. While being spaces of 
radical liberatory potential, they also function to govern and regulate deviant queer 
subjects; at the same time that they provide a space of resistance for marginalized 
subjects, they also operate as a tool of governance for the society in which they exist. 
Queer heterotopias exist in this tension between liberatory practice and 
governmental regulation. When other options for governing deviant queer subjects 
became available, for example through the neoliberal governmental logic of 
homonormativity, these sites, to some extent, become no longer necessary. These new 
modes of governmental power allow deviant sexualities and subjects to be managed in 
new ways: where they were previously isolated and separated from “proper” society, 
neoliberal governmentality is able to translate deviant subjects into productive citizens. 
Access to the privileges of heteronormative culture includes same-sex marriage, homes 
in the suburbs, and permission to enact queerness in mass media. Through discourses 
that equate freedom and equality with privatized domesticity and consumption, 
neoliberalism provides a means of straightening out deviant and intolerable subjects 
and brings them, these newfound and welcome citizens, to the same systems of 
government as their straight counterparts. This obviates the need for the regulatory 
function of queer heterotopias; vestiges of an earlier queer culture, they are no longer 
needed – neither by the straight culture that relied on them to keep deviant subjects at 
bay nor by the reformed gay subjects who have found legitimacy and comfort in 
homonormative forms of private life. 
The power operations at play here are complex. While locales like sex clubs and 
bars allow for the construction and maintenance of queer subjectivities, they also police 
and regulate deviant subjects and desires, protecting the dominant social order from the 
queer menace. At the same time, techniques of neoliberal governmentality and 
homonormativity provide contemporary gay and lesbian subjects with access to many 
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of the material and symbolic benefits long reserved for straights. It is tempting to frame 
this transformation as a movement from previously existing forms of freedom to 
current forms of domination, but this is a problematic position. For one thing, it 
romanticizes earlier forms of queer culture, ignoring the high price participants paid 
and the important struggles they fought for recognition of rights and civil liberties.9 It 
also denies the agency of contemporary gays and lesbians who choose homonormative 
ways of life, framing them as witless dupes who simply don’t understand the issue. What 
is more useful is to see these transformations as a shift from one mode of governing to 
another, each with its own set of pros and cons. And while much is lost in this move 
toward integration, much is also gained. The prevailing narrative (as well as mine so far) 
suggests that these two options – radical freedom in spaces of otherness or 
homonormative domesticity – are mutually exclusive, that we can choose one only and 
must, in turn, abandon the other. Such discourse forecloses the possibility of other – 
queer – possibilities for organizing queer space and life. But as a strategic discourse of 
governmentality, it brings queer subjects into the fold of neoliberal citizenship and 
reconstructs them as productive members of an advanced capitalist society. The 
important struggle at hand isn’t between radical queerness and domestic 
homonormativity; instead, it is the struggle against the “cultural homogenization” 
promoted by neoliberalism’s regime, its appeal leveraged through benefits, privileges, 
and rights in reward for becoming a particular kind of citizen.  
                                                
9 See Doug Ireland’s 1978 article in New York Magazine titled, “Rendezvous in the Ramble” in 
which he recounts a string of gay-bashings that had occurred in Central Park and the indifference 
these victims were met with by police and the public.  
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In the spring of 2009, the smartphone-using gay world was introduced to Grindr, 
a technology that would rapidly become significant for gay life. Grindr – like similar 
apps that followed with names like Growlr, Scruff, and Mister – is a smartphone 
application that lets “gay, bi, and bi-curious” men to connect with one another. These 
apps have made it possible for gay men to see other gay men in their immediate 
neighborhood or interact with them in novel ways. With the unique geolocative 
capabilities of devices like the iPhone, users encounter a grid of thumbnail images of 
men ordered by physical proximity; the closer the image to the top of the screen, the 
closer in space to the user. Like dating sites, users create a profile with a brief bio and a 
picture of themselves. Two users can then chat, share pictures, or send detailed location 
information to each other.  
Figure 7: Screenshots of Grindr’s home screen grid and a profile page of a user. 
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Although a number of similar apps now cater to specific gay sub-groups, Grindr 
was the first application of its kind. By exploiting the still unusual geolocative abilities of 
the iPhone, it provided a unique service. Websites like gay.com, manhunt.com, or 
adam4adam.com had performed similar social and cultural functions but were 
geolocative only insofar as users could provide their location. Grindr, in contrast, is 
fundamentally premised on users’ knowledge of the proximity of the men who appear 
on their screens: without that functionality Grindr wouldn’t exist. This affordance of 
smartphones profoundly changes the nature of technology-mediated communication, 
presenting users with a landscape to navigate that is both enticing and confusing. 
Initially, because of its novelty, few codes or conventions dictated the “right” or 
“wrong” ways to use or behave on Grindr. Were users supposed to be making friends or 
only looking for random sex hookups? Was it acceptable to ask someone out on a “date” 
or were users meant merely to organize sexual rendezvous? Should the situation arise, 
would it be appropriate to ask someone for a job on Grindr? These were some of the 
questions users faced in the early days of Grindr. But even though the application 
provided users with a new set of technical, social, and cultural affordances, it was 
inevitably rooted in the preceding codes and forms of gay culture. Balsamo emphasizes 
that technological innovation is both determined by and determining of culture; that is, 
in order for a new technology to be legible to users it must reproduce certain elements of 
the old while also creating new elements (2011, p. 10). These elements – tangible and 
intangible alike –include material forms, cultural meanings, technical or behavioral 
affordances, regulatory frameworks, systems of knowledge, standards and codes, and so 
on. In this way, “the process of technological innovation is reproductive: every 
technology replicates previous possibilities and makes new ones manifest” (2011, p. 10). 
Recognizing this aspect of technology – that to be comprehensible it must necessarily 
connect to some previous forms of technology and modes of conduct – allows us to 
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situate it historically. In the case of Grindr, it is the well-entrenched gay cultural practice 
of cruising that informed its production, design, and use. 
People use Grindr for multiple reasons and to multiple ends. These range from 
seeking friendships, exchanging recipes, getting book or movie recommendations, 
gossiping, keeping in touch with people, and exchanging photos. But its notoriety stems 
from its use is as a facilitator of romantic and sexual encounters between men, 
otherwise known as cruising. Cruising is the practice of gay men seeking out 
“anonymous” and casual sexual encounters, often in public spaces like parks, public 
washrooms, and truck stops. The term now incorporates new communications 
technologies like 1-900 phone services and the Internet. Cruising provides the semiotic 
base on which the meanings and current cultural status of Grindr rely.  
While not necessarily practiced by all gay men, cruising, as part of a broader open 
sexual culture, has historically played an important role in the articulation of a resistant 
queer sexual culture. Further, beyond simply providing gay men with a sexual outlet, 
cruising is productive and supportive of gay identities, communities, and lifestyles and 
is part of a much broader gay sexual culture. Contrary to popular depictions of cruising 
as vacuous and dangerous10, it is a practice through which gay culture has come to 
understand itself as not just separate or different from the mainstream, but as being a 
valuable cultural practice. As Michael Warner writes: 
The sexual cultures of gay men and lesbians are, after all, cultures in ways 
that are often forgotten, especially when they are treated simply as a mass 
of deviants looking for hormonally driven release. They recognize 
themselves as cultures, with their own knowledges, places, practices, 
languages, and learned modes of feeling… What we share [as queers] is an 
ability to swap stories and learn from them, to enter new scenes not 
                                                
10 See, for example, Cruising, the 1980 film written and directed by William Friedkin and starring 
Al Pacino. In this film, gay sexual practices are depicted as both deviant and dangerous to 
practitioners and society at large.  
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entirely of our own making, to know… that one’s task in the face of 
unpredicted variations is to recognize the dignity in each person’s way of 
surviving and playing and creating, to recognize that dignity in this 
context need not be purchased at the high cost of conformity or self-
amputation (1999, pp. 178-179). 
For Warner, cruising makes possible the creation of queer counter-publics that 
suggest alternative ways of living. He shows that these activities, often portrayed and 
interpreted as valueless, deviant, and harmful by the mainstream, can be significant and 
valuable to their participants. Further, cruising constitutes a distinct culture and to that 
end possesses specific trappings unique to that culture – codes of language and dress, 
sensibilities, and structures of feeling that are embraced by its participants. Cruising and 
other open sexual practices teach participants the variety of ways in which they can be 
queer, passing on sexual knowledge not otherwise or elsewhere available. And, most 
significantly in Warner’s view, in line with the diversity of queer sexual culture, cruising 
and queer sexual cultures more generally teach people how to recognize the inherent 
value and dignity in others as well as in oneself. 
To return to Doug Ireland’s piece “Rendezvous in the Ramble,” written in the 
wake of a series of brutal gay bashings in the summer of 1978:  
What disturbed me was the smell of fear on these men. It was not fear of 
being beaten. These men are there looking not for danger but for a point of 
contact, a moment of warmth and touching and comfort. Theirs is a more 
terrible fear – fear of discovery (1978). 
Far from being anonymous, casual, or meaningless, for many men, especially during 
those periods when gayness was subject to extreme forms of persecution, cruising 
provided a means of communion and acceptance. It allowed them to experience 
affection, intimacy, and belonging in ways not available to them in broader society. 
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“There,” Ireland writes, “in the darkness of the night, Paul finds a few moments of 
release with his own kind. Then he returns to his home, his wife, his children” (1978). 
Historically, the Ramble has functioned as a queer heterotopia.11 Cruising is one 
way that such queer heterotopias come into being. They are places that function as 
“other.” They permit forms of sociality and identity not permissible elsewhere and 
subvert the dominant norms of gender and sexuality. And in this way, cruising, and the 
queer heterotopias it makes manifest, has been absolutely crucial not only for the 
creation and maintenance of queerness but in providing a population of outcasts with a 
space of belonging. Another of Ireland’s interview subjects states, “It was the only place I 
had heard of where I could find someone who was like me… I never knew there were so 
many gay people! For the first time I didn’t feel like a freak” (1978). 
Grindr is a novel technology made possible only through the recent development 
and proliferation of smartphones. But though hi-tech and modern, Grindr is 
simultaneously linked to a more familiar cultural and historical context. An important 
question, then, is whether it is possible that Grindr produces a queer heterotopia in the 
same way that cruising in the Ramble did in the 1970s?  
Queer space is often invisible even when it isn’t; it is “in large part the function of 
wishful thinking or desires that become solidified….The observer’s complicity is key in 
allowing a public site to be co-opted in part or completely” (Désert 1997, p. 21). Under a 
hegemonic heterosexist spatial order, for queer spaces to come into being requires some 
sort of shared consensus. Observers and occupants of queer space need to agree on its 
queerness for it to exist. This doesn’t mean that a hostile or disapproving subject can 
prevent a queer space from materializing, but it does mean that until someone is made 
aware of it, it is not actually in a queer space. Queer space can be difficult to define and 
even to identify.  
                                                
11 This is no longer the case after the “sanitization” of the queer public spaces in New York like the 
Ramble, Times Square, and the Christopher Street Pier. 
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As Lefebvre reminds us, “social spaces interpenetrate one another and/or 
superimpose themselves upon one another. They are not things which have mutually 
limiting boundaries and which collide because of their contours or as a result of inertia” 
(1991, p. 87). A space is never only one thing to the exclusion of all others. But spaces are 
often in tension with one another and the apparent coherence of a space can be 
disrupted. Queer activism by groups like ACT-UP operated on the assumption that a 
queer presence could disrupt the hegemony of straight space, and that the more visible 
the presence – the more in opposition to normative heterosexuality it was – the greater 
the disruption. Enough disruption will produce a transformation of a space, and in turn 
a transformation of social relations. As I have said, however, flamboyant queer 
performance and homonormative domesticity are not two separate and mutually 
exclusive spaces. Put another way, the Master’s House is not totally divided from the 
Queer House. ACT UP’s activism made strategic use of both houses, and spaces between 
the two. Early on, the group decided that actions carried out explicitly in the name of 
ACT UP would be determined by consensus: these would be mass actions with unified 
messages, graphics, and tactics. Smaller affinity groups carrying out related actions 
could do so within the larger action but under different names. The overall working 
policy “ACT UP! FIGHT BACK! FIGHT AIDS!” was able to unite anti-authoritarian 
activists (queers behaving badly) with increasingly organized challenges to the medical-
industrial complex, by now well-researched and understood, including a highly 
professional campaign to educate the media and in turn influence public perception of 
the treatment crisis. The strategy included the dissemination to the media of handsome 
press kits, carefully selected images, and video of people with AIDS living their lives (as 
opposed to stereotypical portrayals of lone gaunt figures waiting to die). In other words, 
the strategy involved turning the tactics of a massive bureaucracy against it.12 
                                                
12 For a fuller description of the formation, actions, and tactics of ACT UP, see Crimp & Rolston, 
1990 and Treichler 1999. 
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The salient question at this point with respect to Grindr is whether or not it 
engenders the production or expansion of queer space, and thus possesses the potential 
to disrupt hegemonic heterosexuality, or whether, by relegating queer social relations to 
the realm of the virtual and the invisible, it further erases queers and queer space? Does 
logging onto Grindr while mobile disrupt space or relegate users to yet another invisible 
queer geography? Rowen Wilken contends that  
networked mobility actually forces a renegotiation of place, and leads to 
significantly altered understandings of place and place-making. This is 
theorised as a shift from a traditional understanding of place as stable and 
fixed (stabilitas loci), to a reconceptualisation of place as formed in and 
through mobility (mobilitas loci) (2005). 
By creating a technology and a set of relations that brings together geographically 
distributed users, Grindr facilitates the production of a novel queer space, but an 
intangible and invisible one. Mobile ICTs bring the distant world into the local at the 
same time that they transport individuals from the local immediate space to the 
security, invisibility, and potential anonymity of the virtual. By bringing together queers 
who would otherwise be unknown to each other, Grindr could be said to play a 
significant role in creating a productive queer space. By expanding the range of sites 
where queerness can be expressed, Grindr disrupts heterosexist space by diffusing gay 
sexual relations beyond their typical realms. Also, by aiding in the transmission of a 
queer sensibility to individuals in regions where it otherwise would be absent, geosocial 
apps promote a sense of queerness less dependent on physical geography. In this way, 
the immaterial space created by geosocial apps like Grindr can be thought of as 
heterotopic. They bring together a constellation of “impossibilities” into one spatial 
context: geographically distant people occupy it simultaneously and provides a space 
for where heteronormative standards are suspended. Productive and nurturing of queer 
identities and sensibilities, the heterotopic space of Grindr is one to be celebrated.  
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Is Grindr a “freedom device”? Not all of its users think so. A cascade of negative 
reviews on Grindr’s website complain about its lax and inconsistent policies, poor 
support, and questionable concern for privacy and anonymity. Media reviews charge 
that Grindr takes the fun and romance out of sex, that it appears to favor particular 
types of physical beauty, and that it doesn’t clearly distinguish between expressions of 
sexual preference (e.g., “prefer Asian men,” “no femmes”) and racism (“no chocolate,” 
“no curry”). A television review is titled “An Axe to Grindr.”  
 And when it comes to efforts to create Grindr-like apps for women, straight or 
gay, there is little celebration in the commentary:  
“So, I’ve been trying out this lesbian dating app...” (begins a post by lisa luxx on 
xojane uk, February 11, 2013): 
It’s called Brenda, which is the least sexy name ever. It’s made up of a big 
grid, like Grindr, and is organised geographically, like Grindr. It’s 
essentially a real life gaydar, like Grindr. Except, it’s called Brenda…. 
Brenda, for those who don’t know, is the lesbian-dating app with quite 
possibly the unsexiest name ever. Coincidence? I think not.... When I first 
downloaded Brenda I thought it was a cracking idea. Map out potential 
lovers within a five mile radius, anytime. Must remember to stay groomed, 
moisturised and tanned at all times... you never know when a lady of fancy 
may strike. However, Brenda is a bit like the discard pile in a game of 
rummy. Doesn’t mean the cards are no good, but they’ve just not worked 
out for anyone else who’s had them yet.  
Blendr is an app for straight men and women designed by the same team as 
Grindr. A February 2013 review by Ann Friedman in The New Yorker describes her one-
time-only visit to the site. Her title, “Overwhelmed and Creeped Out,” pretty much sums 
up her experience. In conclusion she observes that a major source of Grindr’s success is 
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its “for us and by us” sensibility. A similar app for women will never succeed until 
women get interested and begin designing it themselves .  
To return to Grindr, there are more profound issues than lax oversight and 
inconsistent policies. The growing reliance on such apps as a form of gay sociality 
threatens heterotopias that exist in physical space. The Pines and Cherry Grove, gay 
communities on Fire Island, have long been a summertime refuges for gay men and 
women from New York City and beyond. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
they have for decades been a retreat and refuge from the normative space of the city that 
have provided a place where deviant desires could be acted out.13 The cruising that 
occurred at bars and restaurants there brought a productive queer space into being. But 
with the advent of Grindr, guests at the Pines are increasingly relying on it to orchestrate 
hookups and other forms of sociality at the cost of the traditional forms of social contact: 
“Not long ago, you’d walk around here and everybody would be cruising each other, not 
anonymously, but face to face” (Rogers 2012). But with the rapid proliferation of 
smartphones and the popularization of Grindr, “even the Meat Rack, the notoriously 
cruisy wooded area between the Pines and Cherry Grove, has been taken over by 
glowing iPhone screens” (2012).  
Fire Island is a prototypical queer heterotopia. Even now in this age of growing 
acceptance and assimilation, thousands of gay men and lesbians go there to escape 
straight culture and enjoy time amongst others like themselves. These settlements 
“survived the AIDS epidemic, recessions, and, most recently, a fire that destroyed the 
Pines’ legendary nightclub,” but now residents worry that “the popularity of the gay 
hookup app is ruining the island’s unique and delicate social ecology” (2012). For many 
long-time visitors to Fire Island, the impersonality of hook-up apps poses a threat to the 
forms of sociality that contributed to New York’s vital gay culture. Without the face-to-
face contact required by traditional forms of cruising, the sense of community central to 
                                                
13 For a history of these two communities with special emphasis on lesbians, see Newton 1993. 
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Fire Island and to queer constituencies in general becomes harder to maintain. If 
everyone is on their iPhones and not attending the various dinners, dances, and parties 
that make up summer life on the island, the interpersonal dynamics – everything from 
conversing to flirting to having sex – that contribute to Fire Island’s constitution as a 
queer heterotopia quickly disappear. In an interview from 2012, one visitor wondered if 
a place like the Pines would soon have no purpose: “What’s the point… if everybody is 
on Grindr?” (2012). 
With the emergence of geolocative ICTs our relationship with physical space is 
changing. Mobile access to the Internet adds new layers of meaning to physical space. 
With respect to queer heterotopias, this access can be seen as both productive and 
threatening. These technologies bring new heterotopic – if virtual – spaces into 
existence where queer identity and sociality can be nurtured. At the same time they 
potentially threaten to replace previously existing heterotopias that historically had 
central positions in the constitution of modern gay and lesbian subjects. These spaces 
are reliant on non-mediated forms of sociality; the proliferation of geosocial 
applications disrupts these dynamics. But heterotopias are named as they are because of 
their great variety of meanings. The emergence of such technologies contributes further 
to the myriad meanings queer heterotopias already embody. 
This discussion of identity, space, and technology takes the position that all 
technology is an assemblage, defined not by its material limits but by the articulations 
that link material to non-material phenomena: Cell phone towers, satellites, computer 
chips, and LEDs—as well as identities, systems of knowledge, cultural practices, and 
meanings of citizenship. Approaching technology as an assemblage demonstrates how 
queer sexual culture is and has always been a technoculture, not a distinct thing that is 
changing with the addition of a new technology. What this means is that queer sexual 
culture has always incorporated, in different ways and to different degrees, those things 
we often refer to as “technologies.” Indeed, there is no way to think of a queer sexual 
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culture – or any culture – as separate from the artifacts and practices we call 
“technologies.” There would be no cruising without the technologies of the bathroom 
stall, the public park, the machine-milled planks of the boardwalks on Fire Island 
connecting Cherry Grove to The Pines, or the plate glass window upon whose reflective 
surface one catches the desirous eye of another man walking down the street. Like any 
technology, the impact of geo-social applications like Grindr are never stable or 
guaranteed. Grindr provides us with the possibility of movement in multiple directions, 
at once enabling counter-normative sexualities that preserve the sexual openness of 
queer culture while also potentially relegating queerness to the hinterlands of virtuality, 
furthering its invisibility and limiting its potential for disruption.  
Queer space is nowhere. And everywhere. As a heterotopia it evades the 
conventional ways we think about space. As we migrate away from the material 
geographies of the physical world and into the virtual spaces increasingly available to 
us, we must nurture the potential for queer heterotopic space and resist its 
homogenization into a virtual homonormative world. This chapter argues that queer 
heterotopias – nowheres – have shaped how we understand the trajectory of gayness in 
the U.S. as well as its day-to-day existence. Bars and restaurants, bathhouses and public 
restrooms, parks and vacation spots, truck stops and neighborhoods: these are the 
places where gayness has existed and indeed flourished. And since space and subjects 
are mutually constitutive, the spaces that mark the history of gay culture not only 
embraced and allowed for its expression, but also served to bring these identities into 
being. In this way they serve not as a backdrop for the lives of gays and lesbians, but 
function to actively bring into being that which we can point to as gay culture. Their 
preservation is vital. 
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Chapter Three 
Freedom Devices: Mobile Technologies and the Production of Neoliberal Subjects 
As I sit here writing this, I’m listening to “Ceremony” by New Order as it plays on 
my iPhone. During the course of the day, I will pick up this device and carry out a 
number of what are now routine actions: I will check my email and my text messages; I 
will catch up on the day’s headlines and scan a handful of blogs; I will look up the bus 
schedule and the weather and a colleague’s email address; I will get turn-by-turn 
directions to the Telephone Museum in Gridley, Illinois. As I continue to work, it will 
intermittently beep and vibrate, reminding me of tomorrow’s appointments, alerting me 
that someone has commented on a picture I’ve posted on Facebook, gently informing 
me that both my AT&T and Visa payments are due this week. I might play one of the 
many games installed on the phone but have yet to finish, I might test my hearing with 
this interesting little application that plays a series of diminishing beeps into my ears 
through my headphones, and I might even make a phone call.  
My iPhone has become a central yet unremarkable part of my everyday life. 
Impressive when it was released in 2007, the iPhone no longer dazzles. It is easy to forget 
what life was like before mobile information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
and often we find ourselves wondering how we managed to carry out so many of life’s 
daily activities without them; once-vital artifacts of the recent past – roadmaps, cook 
books, landlines, answering machines, CD players – have become useless relics. But 
even though we rely on them to communicate with others, access information, and 
consume media, we put little thought into the bigger role these technologies play in the 
organization and governance of society. Mobile ICTs have become imbricated with the 
systems of rule and governance that shape contemporary life, but because of their 
banality, we frequently overlook their significance in these processes.  
63 
 
As technology extends our capabilities as human actors and social subjects, cell 
phones have come to act as interfaces between the neoliberal state and its citizens. The 
cell phone is a point of intersection between the power of the state and the autonomy of 
the citizen. The rapid proliferation of these devices has pushed governments to try and 
regulate these new virtual spaces and integrate them into existing strategies of power 
and twenty-first century forms of rule. This state of affairs demands interrogation: To 
what extent is mobile technology implicated in these new networks of power, 
information, and capital? How can we most clearly and productively capture the ways 
that the subject – the citizen – is constructed and deployed in contemporary society? 
And by what guiding logics has the neoliberal citizen emerged as a discursive site where 
the multiple and contradictory forces of technology, governance, and identity converge? 
These are crucial questions to ask as people become increasingly reliant on mobile ICTs 
to conduct their everyday affairs. 
In popular advertising, mobile ICTs are often discursively linked with liberal 
humanist constructions of freedom. They are depicted as nothing less than freedom 
devices: tools to be used to achieve and maintain the individual liberty of the neoliberal 
subject. But freedom appears in contradictory ways within neoliberal discourse, at once 
championing individual autonomy and enterprise while also legitimating increasing 
levels of surveillance and social control. Although advertisements for these devices 
promise freedom for their users, a number of nations have begun to police the virtual 
space of mobile communication by enacting legislation that places entire populations 
under opaque forms of state monitoring. In turn, a complex semiotic entanglement of 
individual liberty and state control has come to characterize contemporary neoliberal 
citizenship. Critically analyzing mobile ICTs are they are represented in popular culture 
draws attention to the contradictions of neoliberal governmentality and reveals the 
ways in which the cultural construction of these technologies functions to produce and 
maintain these contradictions. 
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Mobile ICTs represent the technological edge of a host of contemporary social, 
cultural, and political-economic transformations. Their rapid uptake has made them 
central to configurations of modern citizenship, operating as important tools in the 
construction and governance of proper neoliberal subjects. This chapter explores the 
role of ICTs in neoliberal governmentality and in the production of the neoliberal 
subject in particular. By contrasting their cultural construction as freedom devices with 
various regimes of surveillance and regulation being carried out by governments in the 
West, I will show how freedom operates as a discourse that produces neoliberal citizens 
and how discourses of freedom legitimate modern forms of neoliberal control. 
Freedom lies at the core of liberalism. “Freedom,” writes Nikolas Rose, “seems to 
form the foundation of the politics of our present: its presence or absence in particular 
societies, the struggle to achieve it, the conditions that can make it real” (1999, p. 61). But 
liberalism’s significance as a mode of government isn’t in the ways it embodies a novel 
definition, pursuit, or valorization of freedom. Rather, liberalism is important because, 
as Rose states, it represents “the first time the arts of government were systematically 
linked to the practice of freedom” (1999, p. 68). Government here refers to Foucault’s 
formulation of government as the “conduct of conduct.” As explored in his essay 
“Governmentality” (2000) and elaborated in later work, governmentality differs from 
other modalities of rule predicated on force, coercion, or domination. Government 
instead directs its efforts toward the management and shaping of conduct through the 
needs, desires, and knowledge of those being governed. Government is neither about 
making someone do something as a function of rule nor about demanding that another 
carry out one’s will. Instead, government recognizes subjects’ agency and that they exist 
in a field of possible actions; it does not force or demand that they carry out certain 
actions but comes to know its subjects in their specificity and, using that knowledge, acts 
upon the field of possible action so as to encourage its subjects to pursue those paths 
that meet the desired ends of prevailing governing order (Rose 1999, p. 4). Through a 
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diverse range of programs, incentives, and systems of knowledge, the governmental 
state aims to shape the conduct of its citizens to achieve particular ends. 
Governmentality, then, describes the priorities, strategies, and ways of understanding 
rule that are particular to a particular system of government. 
Since government doesn’t act directly upon subjects it must work to shape their 
conduct by acting on their freedom of choice. Choice is no longer a neutral, calculated 
response to a set of conditions made by a rational actor. Instead, as Mitchell Dean points 
out, governmentality produces its required subjects by deploying choice as “a 
fundamental human faculty that can be made calculable and manipulated by working 
on the environment and spaces within which it is exercised” (1999, p. 159). For this to 
work, government takes as its starting point the inherent freedom of those governed. 
That is, governmentality presupposes the ability of subjects to act and to choose – to be 
free – as a condition of rule. This freedom, then, is central to all forms of 
governmentality but to liberal governmentality in particular. Following this, within 
liberal thought, freedom and government are often seen as occupying opposite poles: 
the more individuals are governed the less liberty they have; the more liberty they have 
the less (and better) they are being governed.  
But subjects of liberalism are not governed at the expense of their freedom; they 
are governed through their freedom. In taking this position, I am agreeing with Rose in 
his supposition that “only a certain kind of liberty – a certain way of understanding and 
exercising freedom, of relating to ourselves individually and collectively as a subjects of 
freedom – is compatible with liberal arts of rule” (1999, p. 63). The aim of a critical 
analysis of the strategies and technologies of liberalism, then, isn’t to reveal and 
elaborate on the variety of ways liberal subjects are in reality not free (freedom as a sort 
of false ideology) or to propose ways that they could be freer, but instead to analyze the 
specificity of particular configurations of freedom and to interrogate the conditions by 
which they come into existence and are maintained. In other words, analyzing liberal 
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strategies of government is to figure out what freedom means at a given moment in a 
given place and the consequences that those meanings produce. 
As a particular re-inscription of liberalism, neoliberalism is characterized by its 
emphasis on the expansion of global trade, the diffusion of free-market rationality into 
multiple domains of life, the deregulation of all markets, the responsibilization of 
individual citizens, and the retraction of state intervention in sectors ranging from 
finance to primary education. The governmental techniques of neoliberalism typically 
rely on market-based strategies of incentives and penalties, the marketization of sectors 
not previously understood as markets, the minimization of state regulation of markets, 
and the off-loading of risk from the state onto the citizen. But the formulation of 
neoliberalism in narrowly political-economic ways constructs it as an ideology against 
which another – more egalitarian, more emancipatory, more ethical – ideology is to be 
advanced to achieve “real” liberation. The narrow conception of neoliberalism as simply 
entailing economic policies encourages us to envision it as an abstract, external force to 
which people are passively subjected: the mistaken ideology of greedy businessmen and 
wrong-headed conservative politicians. In conceiving of neoliberalism in this way, we 
risk overlooking the ways in which it constitutes other sets of knowledges and behaviors 
extending beyond the economic, carried out by individual subjects, and through which 
neoliberal governmentality emerges as a coherent social formation.  
Looking at neoliberalism as a political rationality that regulates multiple realms 
of life allows to us think about how it manifests as a coherent set of actions undertaken 
as much by normal citizens as by corporate and government elites and reconstitutes the 
plane of possible interventions in such terms. It draws attention to the “homologies 
across neoliberal economic policies in the market and the everyday discipline and 
character development programs used by teachers in public schools to foster a 
particular kind of calculative accountability” (Nadesan 2008, p. 1), showing that the 
vulgar economism typically deployed to describe neoliberalism fails to capture its true 
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breadth and impact. To conceive of neoliberalism as an assemblage of governmental 
techniques employed in the regulation of all realms of life does not diminish the role of 
the economic in its formulation; instead, it re-situates it as one space, among many, in 
which the subject of neoliberalism is produced and governed.  
Neoliberalism is not just a set of ideas and beliefs championing the merits of a 
free market economy and the liberties of the individual; it is comprised of a broad 
constellation of strategies, tactics, and knowledges that operate on multiple levels. 
Situating neoliberalism within an analytic of governmentality avoids essentializing it to 
a set of economic tenets championing free trade, deregulation, and globalization and 
foregrounds the ways in which neoliberal governmentality encompasses a host of 
techniques by which multiple domains of life are managed and regulated. Importantly, 
this includes the ways in which we employ techniques of governmentality upon 
ourselves as a means of self-configuration as proper, “free,” neoliberal citizens.  
For the desired outcomes of neoliberalism to be achieved, the proper conduct of 
subjects in the absence of a controlling state authority is required. But the effectiveness 
of the strategies of governmentality lies not in their ability to make people “act a certain 
way.” Rather, as Mitchell Dean argues, 
a useful way of thinking about liberalism as a regime of government… is to 
consider the multiple ways it works through and attempts to construct a 
world of autonomous individuals, of ‘free subjects’… This is a subject 
whose freedom is a condition of subjection” (1999, p. 139). 
This is the defining characteristic of governmentality: the subject is produced not by 
being been violently forced into a certain mold, but instead by subtly and gently being 
shaped in particular ways into the proper type of subject. 
Neoliberalism operates through a specific mode of subjectivity premised upon 
the very freedom that governs it. For neoliberal subjects to enact their freedom 
necessarily entails working in accordance with the modality of power that engenders 
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such freedom: being free means being ruled. In this way, neoliberal citizenship is 
characterized by both the continued pursuit of individual freedom as well as forms of 
state control enacted through discourses of freedom. The neoliberal citizen is thus a 
paradoxical figure; at once “free” – that is, self-managing and autonomous – while at the 
same time subject – and subjugated – to a governmental power that regulates and 
manages conduct through the strategic deployment of such freedom. 
The authority exercised by neoliberalism presupposes a state of liberty of its 
citizens; their conduct is not coerced, but is shaped by acting upon the constellation of 
individual “need, desire, rights, interests and choice” (1999, p. 164). These free subjects 
don’t simply exist, but are actively configured such that their exercise of freedom falls in 
line with neoliberal governmental priorities. Thus the freedom of these subjects emerges 
from their subjection to forms of domination that produce them as appropriately 
configured neoliberal citizens. It is the freedom of neoliberal subjects that ensures their 
conduct falls in line with the priorities of neoliberal governmental power; it is via their 
freedom that neoliberal subjects are produced, governed, and controlled. In this way 
freedom becomes a technical modality of government, producing subjects compatible 
with the needs and requirements of neoliberal governmentality. 
With freedom being the primary technical modality by which neoliberal 
citizenship materializes and the “free citizen” the primary vehicle through which 
neoliberal governmental aims are achieved, properly configured “free citizens” are 
necessary for the governmental operations of neoliberalism to operate in a smooth and 
self-regulatory way. As Mitchell Dean writes, political and cultural theories like Marxism 
or feminism “sought a utopian vision of the emancipated self”; in contrast, 
neoliberalism “redeploy[s] the ‘free subject’ as a technical instrument in the 
achievement of governmental purposes and objectives” (1999, p. 155). This “free subject” 
is not the end sought by neoliberalism but rather the means by which neoliberalism 
manifests and operates. By internalizing the governmental priorities of the state and 
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becoming self-governing subjects, these properly configured neoliberal citizens behave 
appropriately in the absence of a dominant state authority. This involves perpetually 
reflecting upon and calibrating the state and conduct of the self. Within neoliberalism, 
self-government is tantamount to freedom, and its production, pursuit, and 
maintenance is a central priority for neoliberal subjects. 
Contrary to liberal humanist ideas of the unalienable liberty of “man,” the free 
subject of neoliberalism doesn’t simply exist, it must be created. Government rules 
through the establishment of a set of conditions – external as well as internal, collective 
as well as individual – whereby those ruled become inclined to naturally pursue – that 
is, to choose – that which satisfies governmentality’s objectives. Subjects come to 
internalize governmental priorities and enact a system of self-management with the aim 
of configuring themselves as proper types of citizens. Given its distance from the 
individual, the neoliberal state requires a citizen that is able to achieve the goals of the 
state without being subjected to its direct control. In this way, the state can direct the 
conduct of its citizens without being responsible for them. Various discourses and 
programs distributed throughout society contribute to the configuration of these free 
subjects. Discourses ranging from self-esteem programs (Cruikshank 1999), reality TV 
(Ouellette & Hay, 2008), and philanthropy (King 2006) are some of the strategies 
through which this subjectivity comes into being. These phenomena, and countless 
others, provide resources for the configuration of individuals into the autonomous, self-
enterprising, self-regulating, and free subjects of neoliberalism. 
Because neoliberal governmentality facilitates the production and government of 
citizens through the postulate to “govern at a distance,” the governmental operations of 
neoliberalism have become dispersed throughout the social body. As the direct 
influence of the state is retracted from the life of the citizen, its governmental aims are 
achieved through the construction of strategic allegiances with private enterprise and by 
advancing a discourse of citizenship that focuses on the autonomy and self-
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determination of individuals in achieving their own freedom, happiness, and security. 
As a function of this maxim to “govern from a distance,” the citizen of neoliberalism 
becomes not only autonomous but is simultaneously tasked with the responsibility of 
managing this autonomy appropriately and effectively. Thus, neoliberal government is 
necessarily self-government and the central strategy of the neoliberal state is the 
diffusion of the means and resources necessary to properly conduct self-government 
throughout the social body. In turn, the government of citizens manifests in a variety of 
arenas including education, medicine, consumption, recreation, and media: social 
institutions, cultural resources, economic policies, and even ways of thinking about the 
self (e.g. self-esteem) are sites of neoliberal governmentality. 
 “Communications networks,” Andrew Barry writes, “have come to provide the 
perfect material base for liberal government” (1996, p. 123). The introduction of 
technologies like rail and telegraphy to the UK in the 19th century, just as with 
contemporary ICTs like the Internet and mobile telephony, provided British society with 
a set of new tools to more efficiently “come to know itself and to govern itself on the 
basis of its own knowledge” (1996, p. 128). With these communications technologies, 
19th century British citizens were empowered to self-govern in the absence of direct 
state influence. At the same time, the distributed communications networks installed 
across the United Kingdom and its empire allowed the British state to monitor and 
regulate populations from great distances. Like 19th century British liberalism, amongst 
the techniques available to contemporary forms neoliberal governmentality are ICTs 
that allow citizens to more efficiently govern themselves and that provide a means for 
state control from a distance.  
Neoliberalism uses freedom as a technical modality of government. Since the 
constitution and government of neoliberal subjects is oriented around an a priori liberty 
residing at the core of every individual, neoliberal governmentality deploys this 
individual liberty in a variety of ways as it pursues its governmental priorities. As 
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mobile ICTs gain computing, geolocation, and media capabilities, they have become 
sites where strategies of neoliberal governmentality and discourses of freedom intersect. 
The devices aid in the production of the self-determining, self-enterprising, and 
autonomous citizens required for neoliberal governmental operations to function. 
Whether using their devices to manage their blood-sugar levels, to track their workouts, 
or to manage their ever-growing network of associates, smartphone users are 
increasingly able to self-govern through mobile ICTs. Since self-governance and 
autonomy are equated with liberty in neoliberalism, these technologies are culturally 
constructed as “Freedom Devices,” artifacts through which the free citizens of 
neoliberalism are configured and sustained. Through the use of these technologies, the 
optimally efficient, responsible, and free citizen emerges.  
At the same time, the increasingly sophisticated ICTs we carry with us now – 
devices that have media, geolocative, and computing capabilities – provide a means by 
which neoliberal states can monitor and control citizens from great distance and in 
largely invisible ways. While state surveillance of mobile ICTs is being carried out 
around the world in various forms, it has recently been reveled in the U.S. that the NSA 
has been conducting a domestic surveillance operation through the collection of cell 
phone metadata of American citizens. The discordance between the NSA’s spying and 
the U.S.’s fetishization of individual liberty (which includes privacy from the surveilling 
gaze of the state) shows how freedom operates in a state of discursive tension in 
neoliberal societies. By comparing the cultural production of mobile ICTs as “freedom 
devices” with a set of governmental practices that appear to function in opposition to the 
American-style conceptions of individual liberty, I will show freedom is a conflicted and 
contradictory construction within neoliberal governmentality. 
We take it for granted that when we use the word “freedom” we know what we are 
talking about. But freedom is a cultural construction; there is no stable or universal 
definition of freedom applicable across all times and places. The particular actions that 
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bring it into being, the state of affairs that indicates its presence, or the variety of 
meanings signified by the word “freedom” at a given point in time for a given group of 
people will say much about how that society understands the nature of citizenship and 
the function of governance. As a near-ubiquitous cultural text, advertisements often go 
overlooked by critical analysis and yet they contribute greatly to the production and 
maintenance of multiple discourses. Because of the rapid proliferation and technical 
development of mobile ICTs, television commercial for cell phone service providers 
constitute an important discursive site where we can come to better understand the 
cultural positioning of these technologies. In particular, they constitute on of the 
primary texts in which mobile ICTs are culturally constructed as freedom devices. 
In “Epic,” a television spot from Canadian wireless carrier Telus Mobility, the 
neoliberal investments in personal freedom and individual autonomy are explicitly 
mapped onto the physical form of the cellular phone (Taxi 2008). The spot opens with a 
close up of a meerkat in an empty white space. As the camera pulls back strings swell in 
the background. The shot cuts to a white frame with the words “We believe in liberty,” 
before quickly cutting back to the shot of the meerkat, now accompanied by two 
companions. The music crescendos and chanting voices are added to the mix. Another 
cut to a white frame with the words “We believe in community” across it before 
returning to the meerkats, now a veritable herd. As the camera pulls back the music 
intensifies and a dark shadow falls over the diminutive creatures as they look to the sky. 
A close up of a raindrop falling to the ground and the words “We believe in instant 
weather forecasts” coincides with the climax of the music. The ad closes with the 
meerkats standing bewildered in the rain and the words “We believe in smartphones for 
all” before presenting in quick succession the array of smartphones Telus has on offer. 
The final image is the Telus logo and their slogan, “The future is friendly.”  
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This commercial, not surprisingly titled “Epic” given its musical selection, is 
explicit in mapping neoliberalism’s ideological commitment to freedom onto the mobile 
phone: the smartphone becomes the physical incarnation of liberty. Further, the 
rhetorical linkage made between freedom and instant weather forecasts frames the 
practices made possible via the smartphone as an enactment of the inherent liberty of 
neoliberal citizens. In the space of fifteen seconds, the commercial moves from grand 
notions of liberty to weather forecasts, equating each with the other.  
A very specific formulation of freedom is deployed in the Telus narrative. 
Humorously, the ad suggests that the ability to foresee the weather, while different from 
more frequently used sources of such information – the daily newspaper, TV, personal 
computer – constitutes some particular form of freedom. The equating of information-
access with freedom frames the smart phone as a form of personal management. 
Figure 8: Screenshots from the Telus commercial, “Epic”. 
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Weather forecasts shape our day; we use them to decide what clothes to wear, whether to 
bring an umbrella with us when we venture out, and if we should reschedule that trip to 
the beach. In the same way, knowing of an approaching hurricane or tornado allows us 
to properly prepare and ensure our safety as well as those close to us. In short, weather 
forecasts are a tool of self-government; they allow us to more effectively prepare for 
forthcoming challenges as self-managing subjects. The Telus spot advances a discourse 
in which self-governance and risk-management are construed as forms of individual 
freedom. The equivalence between self-governance – here in the form of access to 
information – and liberty is not inherent or given; it is discursively constructed through 
cultural texts such as this commercial. Mobile ICTs, then, are deployed in neoliberal 
discourses as a means of accessing and activating this particular configuration of 
individual freedom. 
A second television commercial espousing the liberatory possibilities of mobile 
ICTs comes from E-Trade, a software company that creates stock-trading and portfolio 
management applications. In a 2008 spot, a talking baby sits at his computer and 
describes for the audience a new service being introduced by E-Trade called “Mobile 
Pro” (Smuggler 2008). This application allows users to trade stocks and receive 
streaming quotes on their mobile devices regardless of time or place: 
Baby (speaking to camera, holding a Blackberry): 
Look at this. I’m a free man. I can go anywhere I want now and trade. E-
Trade Mobile Pro. Right on my Blackberry. (Phone vibrates) Wait, hang on, 
gettin’ an email… (Gasps while looking at email) Oh, bad girl! Man! 
(Snickers) Anyway, you know, I can get streaming quotes on th- (Phone 
rings) God, relentless. Hang on one second. (Into handset) Hey girl, can I 
hit you back? 
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Announcer (speaking over a graphic of a Blackberry with a Mobile Pro 
software interface on its screen):  
New E-Trade Mobile Pro. Trade Stocks. Get streaming quotes. Anytime. 
Anywhere. There are a thousand new accounts a day. At E-Trade. 
 
In the commercial’s opening, we see the baby hold up a Blackberry and proclaim, 
“Look at this, I’m a free man,” presenting as self-evident the fact that the smartphone is 
the vehicle through which he activates his inherent freedom and future manhood as a 
neoliberal subject. The mobile phone is represented here as a technology of the self: a 
means by which people are able to reflect upon, evaluate, and regulate their conduct. As 
a technology of the self, Mobile Pro facilitates self-government and allows users to mold 
themselves into the most efficient and productive neoliberal subjects possible. Like the 
Telus commercial, by equating self-regulation, efficiency, and financial security with 
freedom, E-Trade explicitly frames the smartphone as a technology with which 
individuals shape themselves into the free subjects. By allowing the baby to manage his 
stock portfolio wherever and whenever he likes, he is, like the meerkats, able to conduct 
the perpetual management of the self central to the production of neoliberal citizens.  
It is significant in the case of the Mobile Pro commercial that liberty is equated 
with better management of the financial self. While in the Telus ad it was access to 
information that promised liberty through self-management, Mobile Pro’s promise is 
one of better financial citizenship through strategic management of investments. As the 
neoliberal state sheds itself of the responsibilities of social security and corporations 
provide employees with fewer benefits and smaller pensions, it falls on the shoulders of 
the citizen to ensure their financial well-being, especially as they near retirement age. 
Freedom, then, is equated with financial-independence and non-reliance on the state. 
One might make that case that freedom is more easily made possible by a 
comprehensive system of social welfare in which one is free from the challenges of 
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accessing privatized healthcare or an increasingly expensive higher education. But in 
neoliberal discourse it is the retraction of the bloated state from the affairs of citizens 
and the ability to do with one’s money what one sees fit that are markers of liberty. 
Again, while these particular formulations of freedom are presented in these ads as self-
evident, they actually contribute to a highly specific and limited construction of 
freedom as it operates within neoliberal discourse.  
Following the rhetoric of the commercial, neoliberal citizens can become freer by 
using E-trade software, emphasizing that freedom isn’t a property of this subject so 
much as it is a practice that needs to be maintained only through constantly reiteration. 
The pursuit of freedom is never finished; true liberty can never be attained, only 
enacted. Mobile ICTs allow for the constant re-articulation of citizens’ liberty wherever 
and whenever they may find themselves; the smartphone is a perpetual freedom device. 
In providing viewers ways to think about their cell phones as central to their 
freedom, these commercials promote a type of citizenship in which the individual is 
encouraged take on the responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of their 
own security, autonomy, and liberty by strategically using technologies like mobile 
phones. These commercials function as instructional scripts for how to become a better 
citizen by properly deploying the liberatory potential of the cellular phone. In this light, 
Figure 9: The E-Trade Mobile Pro talking baby advertisement. 
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they play an important role not only in the shaping the various meanings attached to 
wireless technologies, but in establishing a narrative of neoliberal citizenship that 
recruits viewers into a logic of self-governance and responsibilization as the 
embodiment of their individual liberty. Through these technologies, individuals 
become good citizens. 
Mobile technologies allow us to execute a number of actions on our selves as 
social beings: we can optimally manage our time, our health, our finances, and our 
social networks. But we don’t need to actually use them to be good citizens; simple 
possession of one of these devices signifies our participation in the dominant social 
order. Those few who don’t possess a mobile phone are puzzling and frustrating to the 
rest of us in part because they become difficult to communicate with, but also because 
they represent a certain aberrant distaste for technology and a refusal to participate in 
the dominant cultural way of life. Further, their rejection of wireless technology 
challenges and infringes upon our freedom as neoliberal citizens. As the Telus and E-
Trade commercials demonstrate, the variety of activities we can conduct via wireless 
technologies signal the freedom of the neoliberal subject. Since the primary purpose of 
mobile ICTs is to connect users to networks of people and data, an individual’s refusal to 
join these networks limits their value to other people, thus reducing their freedom. If I 
enact my individual freedom by sending text messages to friends, someone whoe is not 
accessible via text message is infringing on my freedom as both a smartphone user and 
a neoliberal citizen. As mobile phones become increasingly central in the navigation of 
everyday life, choosing not to own one becomes equivalent to refusing to participate in 
the dominant culture. These “immobile” subjects, then, become bad citizens. 
The capacity of these devices to deliver freedom to their users isn’t limited to the 
self-governing citizens of U.S. and Western consumer societies. The information and 
communication capabilities provided by mobile ICTs also tap into broader ideas of 
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freedom as liberty from state oppression. In these cases, smartphones and similar 
devices are seen as effective weapons against domination. 
In June 2009, Iranian citizens, charging that the most recent presidential 
elections were fraudulent and illegitimate, rose in protest – and were met by a violent 
state crackdown. Traditional media outlets were shuttered and foreign journalists forced 
out of the country, leaving the Internet as the only remaining medium for oppositional 
views to be voiced. But access to the Internet was extremely limited by the state, and 
services such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook – social networking services accessible 
via mobile ICTs – became the primary venues for news of the protests against President 
Ahmadinejad and the state. At the protest’s peak, a YouTube video showing the graphic 
death of Neda Agha-Soltan, a non-political bystander shot by supporters of the existing 
president Ahmadinejad, began circulating on the Internet (Fathi 2009). As its number of 
views skyrocketed, Agha-Soltan became a symbol of the injustice and inhumanity of the 
violence, publicizing the dire situation of Iran’s populace to the world; that it was 
captured on a camera phone dramatically underlined the significance of the technology.  
Dubbed the “Twitter Revolution” by the popular press, the 2009 Iranian protests 
and the world’s knowledge of them were widely attributed to the diffusion of mobile 
ICTs throughout the country. So important was Twitter seen to be in resisting 
Ahmadinejad that when the service announced a routine maintenance shutdown at the 
height of the protests, the Obama administration requested a delay so information from 
Iran could continue to flow. But the Iranian elections were not the first instance of 
mobile ICTs being used to oppose authoritarian governments. Twitter has frequently 
been portrayed in the press as standing in opposition to totalitarian regimes and 
promoting freedom by allowing for the access and distribution of information. In a June, 
2009 article in Time magazine, Steven Johnson wrote,  
Last month an anticommunist uprising in Moldova was organized via 
Twitter. Twitter has become so widely used among political activists in 
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China that the government recently blocked access to it, in an attempt to 
censor discussion of the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre . 
And in response to the growing use of the term “Twitter Revolution” in the summer of 
2009, Marc Ambinder wrote in The Atlantic:  
It’s too easy to call the weekend’s activities the first revolution that was 
Twittered, but when histories of the Iranian election are written, Twitter 
will doubtless be cast as a protagonal technology that enabled the 
powerless to survive a brutal crackdown and information blackout by the 
ruling authorities . 
Framing mobile ICTs as freedom-devices is nowhere more obvious than in a 
piece titled “Revolution by Cell Phone in Iran” written for the Atlanta Journal 
Constitution by former House of Representatives member Republican Bob Barr: “[The 
Ahmadinejad] regime is finding its efforts undermined by cell phone cameras employed 
by demonstrators to record and send images of the demonstrations – and the 
government s sometime harsh methods to stanch them – to friends and media around 
the world” (2009). Barr grants these objects agency, capable of undermining Iran’s 
totalitarian regime, and positions them in direct opposition to the oppressive practices 
employed by the state, thus framing them as inherently democratic objects. Through 
these cultural texts, mobile ICTs are understood as providing their users with increased 
democratic participation and the ability to speak truth to power: cellular 
communications technologies as vehicles for democracy. 
Mobile ICTs have become a site of growing significance for citizen-policing in 
neoliberal societies. At all levels of government, agencies are increasingly using 
information created by or connected to mobile devices as a means of investigating and 
monitoring individuals. In 2009, the New York Police Department started tracking the 
cell phones of people who are arrested by recording the devices IMEI number, a unique 
80 
 
identifier attached to the handset that allows authorities to track the position of the 
device within a cellular network (Parascandola 2009). In May 2010, legislation was 
introduced into the U.S. Senate that would require users of pre-paid cell phones to 
disclose their identities upon purchase and for service providers to keep records of 
users’ identification information (AFP 2010). 
Similar measures are also being implemented outside of the U.S. In 2009, the 
Spanish government implemented legislation requiring all purchasers and users of pre-
paid mobile phones to present government-issued identification at the time of purchase 
or to register with their service providers if they were presently using one of these 
devices anonymously (Diaz 2009). Undertaken under the ominous moniker of 
“¡Identifícate!” or “Identify Yourself,” Spain implemented a nation-wide media 
campaign encouraging users of these devices to register their cell phone lest service get 
cut off. These tactics seek to track the movement and use of wireless ICTs and create 
stable linkages between individuals and their devices. 
The uncovering of the NSA’s domestic spying program PRISM by Edward 
Snowden in June drew widespread attention to the ways in which governments are 
relying on cell phone data as a means of intelligence gathering. As reported by Glenn 
Greenwald, under the auspices of PRISM, cellular service providers were legally 
required to provide user metadata upon request by the NSA (2013b). Included in the 
metadata to be retained were the originating and destination phone numbers, the 
identities of the users, the date, time and duration of all calls, unique identification 
information for relevant hardware being used for both calling and called parties, and 
the geographic location of the the phone calls. Essentially, metadata includes everything 
except the content of the phone call.  
But the activities carried out by PRISM are not novel as a means of intelligence 
gathering. In 2006, the European Union passed the Data Retention Directive, an 
agreement that required service providers of cellular telephony in the EU member states 
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to retain user metadata for a period of no less than six months and no more than two 
years ("Directive 2006/24/E," 2006). This directive legislated the creation of a vast 
database of information storing records of every phone call made within the EU 
Member States. Governments would be able to tell who was calling whom when, where 
from, and using what type of equipment. This was done “in order to ensure that the data 
are available for the purpose of the investigation, prosecution, of serious crimes as 
defined by each Member State in its national law” (2006). These measures were taken in 
a global political climate that had been recently shaken by terrorist attacks in Madrid 
and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively, and the World Trade Center attacks of 2001. 
Each of these attacks had utilized mobile phones in their organization and deployment 
and thus the passing of a directive allowing for mobile phone monitoring seemed an 
appropriate action to take in light of the perceived growth in the threat of terrorism. 
A number of groups have argued against these types of measures. In response to 
the 2006 Data Retention Directive, The Open Rights Group, in partnership with other 
NGOs and civil liberties organization, submitted a brief to the European Court of Justice 
asking “the court to annul [the data retention directive] ordering the blanket registration 
of telecommunications and location data of 494 million Europeans” (Wintle 2008). In 
the brief, the group made the following claims: 
While it threatens to inflict great damage on society, its potential benefit 
appears, overall, to be little. Data retention can support the protection of 
individual rights only in few and generally less important cases. A 
permanent, negative effect on crime levels is not to be expected… [With 
data retention in place] citizens constantly need to fear that their 
communications data may at some point lead to false incrimination or 
governmental or private abuse of the data. Because of this, traffic data 
retention endangers open communication in the whole of society (2008). 
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While these measures are intended to aid in apprehending terrorists and other 
criminals, this possibility is only brought about by placing the mobile phone using 
population at large under compulsory industry and state surveillance. In turn, these 
governmental tactics not only facilitate the apprehension of terrorists, but establish a 
new truth about the nature of mediated communication and citizenship: improper use 
of cellular technology is not just that undertaken with criminal intent, but any 
anonymous activity conducted via this technology. To put it another way, as practices of 
neoliberal governmentality become increasingly reliant on the communication 
networks, visibility within these structures becomes a requirement of good citizenship. 
These measures are intended to monitor criminals and terrorists, but surveillance 
practices like data retention equally monitor the conduct of average cell phone users.  
Objections made to state monitoring programs like PRISM typically invoke a 
liberal humanist conception of the individual as possessing an unalienable liberty 
constantly at threat from the overreaching of government. In describing the failed 
efforts by the NYPD to prevent terrorist attacks by surreptitiously monitoring Muslim 
communities, Connor Friedersdorf writes in The Atlantic, “In other words, there was no 
tradeoff between liberty and security. There was just a loss of liberty” (2012). Similarly, 
commenting on PRISM and the fight against terrorism it represents, he says, “it is not 
rational to give up massive amounts of privacy and liberty to stay marginally safer from 
a threat that, however scary, endangers the average American far less than his or her 
daily commute” (2012). In a New York Times editorial arguing against systems like 
PRISM, the authors state, “The question is whether the security goals can be achieved by 
less-intrusive or sweeping means, without trampling on democratic freedoms and basic 
rights” and these this type of monitoring “fundamentally alters the relationship between 
individuals and their government” (New York Times Editorial Board 2013). Even before 
PRISM, debates about post-9/11 securitization took the form of individual liberty in 
opposition with national security efforts. Writing for the New York Times, Scott Shane 
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asked readers in 2012, “What is the proper balance between liberty and security?” 
(2012a). These are just a sampling of the opposition to PRISM when news of the program 
was revealed. In each of these, the authors stake a claim in the inherent liberty of the 
liberal subject and frame state surveillance regimes as infringing or compromising this 
innate characteristic. 
The binary between freedom and security has also been the predominant way 
defenders of PRISM have framed the debate. Being quoted in the New York Times, 
President Obama argued that, “modest encroachments on privacy” were “worth us 
doing” to protect the country” (Baker & Sanger, 2013). Describing PRISM as involving 
some “trade-offs,” the President concluded that “they help us prevent terrorist attacks.” 
Both defenders and opponents of PRISM understand the debate in terms of privacy 
versus security, individual liberty versus government authority. The difference lies not 
in how each party understands these concepts but in what they think is an appropriate 
trade off between the two sides.  
But the framing of this and similar debates in terms of a balance between liberty 
and authority fails to capture the complexity of freedom as it operates as technical 
modality of governance within neoliberal forms of rule. The public rhetoric around 
PRISM orbits the debate between individual liberty and government domination. While 
this is an important debate, freedom is operating as a strategy of government in other 
ways that are not readily apparent. Even though citizens’ individual liberties are 
seemingly curtailed by this surveillance, neoliberalism accounts for it by situating the 
security of the state and the responsibilization of the individual within a broader 
framework of liberty. As shown above, that this surveillance is objectionable to many 
individuals stems from the belief that the appropriate limits of neoliberal governance 
are ostensibly found in the freedoms of the citizen. Returning to Mitchell Dean, this view 
“suggest[s] that contemporary liberalism guards against governing ‘too much’ by 
appealing to the rights and liberties of individuals” (1999, p. 164). The surveillance of 
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cell phone users and the collection of their information are seen, from this perspective, 
as encroachments upon the fundamental freedoms promised by and that ostensibly 
provide the very conditions for neoliberalism. Although it would seem that these 
practices infringe upon the individual liberty so important to the neoliberal citizen, the 
state is able to account for such violations through the strategic translation of 
widespread surveillance into discourses of freedom. 
A hallmark of neoliberal governmentality is the general off-loading of risk from 
the state onto citizens. These moves have positioned the responsibility for many types of 
securitization in the hands of individuals: people are encouraged to employ strategies to 
protect themselves, their families, and their property from threats previously managed 
by the state. In other words, individuals have become responsible for protecting and 
maintaining their freedom. But in the case of state surveillance of cell phone activities, 
this logic of individual securitization extends from the private realms into the discursive 
space of the society and the nation.  
Perhaps surprisingly, a poll conducted shortly after PRISM was exposed indicated 
that 56 percent of Americans felt that the NSA’s collection of cell phone metadata was 
acceptable in the continued fight against terrorism; 45% indicated that the U.S. 
government should be able to go further than it currently is, saying that “it should be 
able to monitor everyone’s online activity if doing so would prevent terrorist attacks” 
(Cohen 2013). Those on the side of civil liberties would likely view these people are 
misguided or ignorant of the stakes; that, like them, these respondents share a belief in 
the sanctity of individual liberty and would come understand how state surveillance 
compromises these freedoms if they would just pay closer attention. But in some ways, 
these people, those who do not object to PRISM, demonstrate a better understanding – 
or perhaps a more willing acceptance – of the specific configuration of freedom in a 
neoliberal society. Freedom is a technique within a particular formulation of 
government that is used in the configuration and regulation of citizens. By accepting the 
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definition of freedom implicitly advanced by the state – that submitting to certain forms 
of domination (surveillance) is a means of protecting and even enacting individual 
liberty – they are behaving as model neoliberal subjects. 
Through a series of discursive maneuvers, neoliberalism translates systems of 
surveillance and strategies of discipline into a tactics of individual responsibility, 
security, and liberty. Given that, like many governmental operations, the onus for 
ensuring national security is diffused throughout society, to the extent that participation 
in these systems of surveillance can be discursively attached to the defense of the 
country against attack, part of being a good citizen is accepting, and even willingly 
subjecting oneself to, the surveillance of one’s cell phone activities by the state. The 
equivalency constructed between surveillance and freedom in this discourse means that 
the governmental power exercised through state surveillance is the very condition by 
which the free-subject of neoliberalism comes into being. Autonomy and self-
governance – the signifiers of this freedom – are achieved only by submitting to this 
governmental power. Within the framework of neoliberal governmentality, freedom 
and domination are mutually-constituted positions; one is possible only with the other. 
While the mobile phone is discursively framed as a device of freedom, and while 
it enhances our ability to conduct ourselves as free subjects, it also subjugates us to a 
number of complex strategies of governmental power. In both its semiotic and its 
material capacities, the mobile phone embodies contradictory impulses, functioning to 
empower but also control neoliberal subjects through the deployment of freedom as a 
technique of government. At once it is empowering, providing users with the tools 
necessary to become free subjects of neoliberalism. At the same time it functions as a 
means of surveillance, situating its users within systems of state domination. Wireless 
technologies contribute to our configuration as neoliberal subjects in a variety of ways: 
on the one hand they provide us with the means to conduct the constant evaluation and 
management that is necessary for the self-governing neoliberal subject; on the other 
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hand, they position us within new fields of visibility that make it possible for us to be 
passively monitored and regulated from a distance.  
These apparent contradictions circulate around the various meanings of freedom 
within neoliberalism. Far from being a semantically stable abstraction, freedom is fluid 
and flexible signifier and is constantly in a state of discursive tension within neoliberal 
discourse. Freedom is the structuring logic animating neoliberalism; as such, it is 
subject to multiple interpretations and contestations and is deployed to achieve a 
number of sometimes contradictory aims. 
But beyond this, freedom is a technical apparatus of neoliberal governmentality. 
It doesn’t merely describe, but performs. Using freedom, neoliberal governmentality can 
justify the offloading of various types of risk and responsibility – health care, education, 
retirement security – from the state onto the citizen since these actions can be framed as 
contributing to the autonomy of the individual and limiting state intervention in the 
private lives of citizens. Similarly, freedom is deployed to legitimate wide-reaching 
systems of domestic surveillance by through discursively translating the concerns of 
national security into the terms of individual liberty. But it isn’t all about domination 
and subjugation; neoliberal configurations of the free subject also make possible 
advances in civil liberties of marginalized groups. But the ways that freedom is 
strategically deployed to achieve multiple, sometimes contradictory ends, illustrates that 
it is not a mere abstraction, but a tool utilized in the execution of neoliberal 
governmentality. Freedom doesn’t just describe the nature of neoliberal subjects; 
instead, it performs a crucial role in the configuration and regulation of these subjects. 
Interrogating the role of wireless technologies within governmental systems 
foregrounds the extent to which the often unseen technological structures that support 
our social, political, cultural, and economic systems establish a framework that 
promotes certain actions, behaviors, and ways of thinking while limiting others. The 
way in which these technologies promote certain types of conduct, subjectivity, and 
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ways of thinking are easily overlooked under neoliberalism since they appear to have 
built in opt-out options. No one is forced to own a cell phone, for instance, and if an 
individual is put off by the surveillant potential of the device then they can always 
choose just not use it.  
This argument is effective in that it relies on the freedom of choice central to 
neoliberal citizen; the free subject is, above all, free to choose and not owning a cell 
phone is indeed a legitimate choice. But while none of us is forced to own one of these 
devices, we are embedded within a social and cultural landscape in which not owning 
these technologies is met with a range of penalties and disadvantages. It is increasingly 
difficult to configure oneself as a good neoliberal citizen without using these devices. So 
we freely adopt these technologies that while providing us with a host of new 
conveniences and sources of pleasure allow us to be governed in more refined, efficient, 
and self-regulatory ways. That these technologies have become essential to day-to-day 
living reflects their importance as tools of governmental power. 
The mobile phone emerged from a particular social, cultural, and historical 
context that gives its existence, its form, and its capacity, coherence and legitimacy. It 
only “makes sense,” technically and socially, as a result of a much broader system of 
truth that lends coherence and legitimacy to our specific way of ordering human 
relations. Just as the neoliberal state is possible only because of a specific set of beliefs 
about state, society, and citizen, cellular technology is made possible not as the natural 
result of technological evolution, but because of the specific configurations of subject, 
power, and state within neoliberal governmentality. This position demands a more 
elaborate formulation of the cell phone, one that looks not only at its material form and 
technical capacity, but that recognizes it as a social and cultural object. When we take on 
a technology as an object of study, we should not investigate the effects of the 
technology, but rather what produced the technology – what the technology an effect 
of?” The cell phone is both a tool of neoliberal governmentality as well as an expression 
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of it. I stress this because I agree with John Law when he writes, “we have no difficulty in 
inscribing texts on bodies, or constituting agents discursively. But… it does not occur to 
us to treat machines with the same analytical machinery as people” (1991, p. 8). Even in 
a discussion of social power and technology, it is too convenient and easy to see 
technology as simply utilitarian as opposed to a culturally and socially constituted 
feature of everyday life.  
The “free citizen” of neoliberalism is a strategic construction that permits for the 
smooth operation of neoliberal governmentality. Wireless devices are embedded in an 
economy of signification in which they are conferred multiple meanings and figure into 
the production and governance of neoliberal citizens in a number of ways; by 
examining their cultural production, we can see how these devices are framed as 
embodying, promoting, and disseminating the dictates of neoliberalism as they are 
reflected in the rhetoric of individual freedom, autonomy, self-enterprise, and choice 
that surround cell phones and other mobile information technologies. The mobile 
phone is culturally constructed as a freedom device, but it is also implicated in complex 
systems of rule and power. This contradiction of freedom and domination inherent in 
the neoliberal subject is in part made possible by the technological infrastructures that 
undergird 21st century life. Mobile communications technology plays an increasingly 
central role in the operations of neoliberal governmentality. This examination of 
contemporary mobile ICTs illustrates the complicated ways in which governance and 
citizenship, freedom and domination, autonomy and control, function in a constant 
state of tension in neoliberal societies. 
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Chapter Four 
New Visibilities: Distributed Surveillance and the Big Brother Mythology 
Two recent technological innovations have changed the way we think about 
surveillance. First is the explosion of information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) that are personal, networked, and mobile. As I posited in the previous chapter, 
ICTs like smartphones and tablet computers have altered the ways we communicate, 
access information, and consume media. The significance of the digitization of 
communication and information practices cannot be overstated: it is what allows these 
media practices to be monitored, recorded, stored, and analyzed as never before. 
Second, data collection and analytics on a massive scale allow this glut of information to 
be deployed in new types of surveillance. By linking vast databases storing information 
ranging from online browsing habits to purchase histories to social media activity, big 
data analysis allows individuals to be known and monitored at a breadth and depth not 
previously possible. 
Perhaps the most dramatic recent evidence of this scope has been provided 
Edward Snowden, a former systems analyst contracted at the National Security Agency 
(NSA), who in 2013 leaked to the media and the public massive quantities of the NSA’s 
classified data monitoring and collection practices. In a June, 2013 interview with 
journalist Glenn Greenwald, Snowden stated that, “even if you’re not doing something 
wrong you’re being watched and recorded; and the storage capabilities of these systems 
increase every year, consistently, by orders of magnitude,” and that even as an outside 
contractor, “sitting behind my desk, I certainly had the authority to wiretap anyone: 
from you or your accountant to a federal judge or even the President”(2013a). As 
Snowden’s leaks were made public, the scope of the NSA’s surveillance practices – both 
foreign and domestic – were discovered to be much wider reaching and granular that 
was ever previously imagined. The proliferation of digital, networked communication 
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technologies and the gargantuan amounts of data they generate make this type of near-
ubiquitous surveillance a breeze by many standards. At any other point in history this 
would have been impossible. As Alfred McCoy writes in Mother Jones, 
Once upon a time, surveillance (on such a scale) was both expensive and 
labor intensive. Today, however, unlike the US Army's shoe-leather 
surveillance during World War I or the FBI's break-ins and phone bugs in 
the Cold War years, the NSA can monitor the entire world and its leaders 
with only 100-plus probes into the Internet's fiber optic cables.  
He continues:  
“[T]he NSA's latest technological breakthroughs look like a bargain 
basement deal when it comes to projecting power and keeping 
subordinate allies in line – like, in fact, the steal of the century….[T] the 
NSA's surveillance programs have come with such a discounted price tag 
that no Washington elite was going to reject them (2014). 
But world leaders and other global players are not the only targets. The rapid 
growth and adoption of information technologies like smartphones and the internet 
capture interactions with these devices as data. Web browsers record not only which 
sites we visit but also where on a given webpage we click and the particular ways that we 
move the mouse across the screen; online stores track what products we look at and for 
how long as well as which ones we go on to purchase; cell phone service providers keep 
records detailing our phone calls and texts, the locations from which we make our calls, 
and with whom we’re communicating; the photos we take on our smartphones are 
geotagged and our location data collected by multiple services and companies, 
ultimately creating an ever more accurate digital picture of ourselves. In short, we now 
live in an era in which almost all of our activities, communications, and interactions 
leave behind some sort of digital trace which is collected, stored, analyzed, and sold, 
largely without our awareness or consent.  
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But while surveillance practices have changed significantly in technical, cultural, 
and social domains, popular understandings of surveillance fail to capture these 
changes. Even as they acknowledge and even embrace new technologies, these accounts 
continue to advance a top-down, state-monopolized surveillance model. These 
representations lean heavily on the narrative of surveillance popularized in George 
Orwell’s 1984 (1949/2003) in which a totalitarian state controls its citizens through 
coercive forms of monitoring and discipline. It is a dramatic and frightening book. As an 
explanatory framework, however, Big Brother can’t begin to account for the functions 
and practices of surveillance within contemporary society nor the complicated power 
operations at play.  
In this chapter, I examine a number of emerging forms of data-driven, 
distributed surveillance. The growth of personal ICTs has led to a proliferation of the 
means of surveillance, altering the power dynamics typically used to describe such 
practices. By analyzing the specific tactics and logics of surveillance, I show how the Big 
Brother mythology perpetuates profound misunderstandings and of the nature and role 
of surveillance today.  
New information technologies and data analytics provide us with myriad benefits 
ranging from the ability to effectively track flu infections (Bort 2012) to more accurately 
diagnose cancer (Grant 2013). But these same technologies also allow us to be identified 
and tracked in ways that are increasingly opaque and refined.14 With their implications 
of centralized authority, emerging forms of surveillance resonate strongly with the 
mythology of Big Brother: we are increasingly being watched in ways we don’t 
completely understand by entities that we are told are benevolent yet seem to approach 
each of us as potential criminals. For these reasons, new surveillance technologies are 
often accompanied by the specter of Big Brother.  
                                                
14 For examples of these strategies of monitoring and identification, see Wallis 2013, Mearian 
2011, Ingram 2013, and (Ungerleider 2012). 
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Big Brother was introduced in George Orwell’s 1984 as the authoritarian dictator 
of the post-global war state of Oceania (1949/2003). 1984 follows the trials of Winston 
Smith as he struggles to survive under the totalitarian rule of Big Brother. The 
population of Oceania is kept under absolute control through perpetual monitoring and 
aggressive propaganda; whether at home or in public, citizens are under constant 
surveillance and bombarded with messages of absolute state authority: posters 
exclaiming “Big Brother is watching you” are plastered throughout the city. The power 
of Big Brother is total; as legal scholar Daniel Solove writes: 
Big Brother demands complete obedience from its citizens and controls all 
aspects of their lives. It constructs the language, rewrites the history, 
purges its critics, indoctrinates the population, burns books, and 
obliterates all disagreeable relics from the past. Big Brother’s goal is 
uniformity and complete discipline, and it attempts to police people to an 
unrelenting degree—even their innermost thoughts. Any trace of 
individualism is quickly suffocated (2004, p. 29). 
The primary surveillance technology in 1984 is the telescreen: a two-way media 
device installed in all homes that both broadcasts propaganda and monitors citizens. 
The telescreen is perpetually on – “it could be dimmed, but there was no way of shutting 
it off completely” – and there is no way of knowing whether one is being watched or not. 
The constant possibility of surveillance and the threat of punitive action shapes Winston 
into a docile subject of the state: “You had to live – did live, from habit that became 
instinct – in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in 
darkness, every movement scrutinized” (1949/2003, pp. 90-91). Ubiquitous monitoring 
is coupled with extreme punitive measures in 1984, ensuring absolute ideological 
compliance through the internalization of Big Brother’s surveillant gaze. So great is the 
risk of non-compliance that Winston makes sure to “set his features into the expression 
of quiet optimism which it was advisable to wear when facing the telescreen” 
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(1949/2003, p. 92). Not only must his conduct be in line with the dictates of Big Brother, 
but so must his thoughts and disposition. 
The surveillance strategies in 1984 function only in the service of the state and 
are only ever oppressive in nature. Big Brother’s power is singular and unidirectional; it 
utilizes a variety of surveillance techniques to violently enforce its will upon citizens 
whose safety is guaranteed only through complete submission. The invocation of Big 
Brother in contemporary popular culture, then, reflects anxiety about invasive 
surveillance regimes as well as oppressive state authority. This narrative of surveillance 
and the model of total state power it embodies are seductive in their simplicity and the 
ways they appear to threaten the most sacred tenet of liberal democracy: the inherent 
freedom of the individual. The Big Brother narrative is powerfully compelling because it 
taps into society’s greatest fears. The way in which it neatly concentrates evil in the 
figure of a single entity – the state – provides an easy way to understand oppression and 
allows us to avoid addressing the complicated morality and politics of contemporary 
surveillance practices. For these reasons, the Big Brother narrative is convenient as well 
as compelling, a narrative that helps to make sense of contemporary surveillance 
regimes. 
So while today’s surveillance strategies are markedly more sophisticated than 
those in 1984, they are nonetheless predominantly understood within the 1984 
framework. Journalistic accounts of emerging surveillance technologies almost always 
liken monitoring schemes to Big Brother-like oppression. For example, when British 
newspaper The Guardian began publishing Snowden’s leaked NSA reports, the public 
learned that a program named PRISM was allowing the NSA to collect cell phone 
metadata from Verizon (Greenwald 2013b). As news of the surveillance spread 
throughout the web, bloggers and journalists repeatedly invoked Big Brother as a 
framework to understand the NSA’s activities: “Big Brother: Feds Collected Millions of 
94 
 
Verizon Phone Records” (Pace 2013), “Fox Hosts Go After NSA’s ‘Big Brother’ Overreach” 
(Vamburkar 2013), and “Is 1984 Now? Big Brother is Watching” (Spiering 2013). 
But I agree with political scholar Giovanni Navarria when he writes, “to 
understand the updated strategy of power in the age of networks and computers, it is 
necessary to look at the whole process from a different and wider perspective – one 
where Orwellian metaphors of ‘Big Brother’ may be actively misleading” (2006). While 
seductive, the Big Brother mythology is inadequate to capture the ways in which new 
modes of surveillance operate within contemporary structures of power and 
governance. Despite this, it remains the dominant explanatory narrative for 
contemporary surveillance regimes. 
Together, the rise of personal media technologies and the development of 
sophisticated big data analytics have created a new and under-examined surveillance 
landscape. Further, the convergence of consumer technologies with media capture, 
production, and dissemination capabilities now distribute the means of surveillance 
throughout society. The spread of these technologies has created a regime of new 
visibilities and contemporary surveillance that is polycentric, distributed, and 
networked, emanating from multiple sources and conducted through myriad 
technologies. At the heart of these strategies is a host of new analytical techniques that 
fall under the umbrella terms of visibility and big data. It is primarily this characteristic 
of modern surveillance regimes that distinguishes them from the surveillance of Big 
Brother. 
In the following pages, I describe a number of emerging forms of surveillance 
made possible by new ICTs and big data analytics. Three trajectories of surveillance 
emerge: familiar top-down practices carried out by state and corporate entities to 
monitor the activities of citizen-consumers; practices of sousveillance, a term coined by 
computer scientist and ethicist Steve Mann (2003), that reverses the traditional 
directionality of surveillance and challenge existing power structures; and practices of 
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lateral surveillance in which people monitor each other via personal media technologies 
and social networking services. 
Citizens of the U.S. today are constantly creating data; in turn, those data are 
collected, stored, and sold, usually without our awareness. But this information is not 
being collected arbitrarily or inadvertently: it is collected because it is exceptionally 
valuable. Data brokers – companies that collect, aggregate, and ultimately sell people’s 
personal information – gather data from sources such as public records, consumer 
surveys, and purchasing histories harvested from customer loyalty cards and store this 
information in vast electronic databases. Acxiom, one of the largest of these database 
marketing companies, has information on over 500 million people around the world, 
including most of the adult population of the U.S. (Beckett 2013). In addition to basic 
demographic info – age, gender, race, income, education level, occupation, and so on – 
these databases keep records about peoples’ hobbies, the movies they watch, the 
charities they donate to, and what “life-event triggers” – major life events like having a 
baby, getting married, getting divorced, making a large purchase – are about to come up 
in their lives. 
Managing these data-- collecting, storing, and analyzing—has become a huge 
industry; Axciom alone reported $77.26 million—what does this number mean? Is 
something missing? in profit in 2012 (Singer 2012). Data are big business, but it is not 
only because of money. While data aggregation and analysis have proven valuable in 
marketing and advertising, these practices are also being put to much different use in 
political campaigns (Lampitt 2013), medical research (Harris 2012), transportation 
analysis (Ovide 2012), and, of course, surveillance (Mearian 2011). 
The challenges posed by big data, as well as its imagined potential, are driving a 
rush in both industry and academia to capitalize upon it. According to an IBM report, 
“Big data is riding a sharp growth curve… [growing] worldwide from $3.2 billion in 2010 
to $16.9 billion in 2015” which represents a “compound annual growth rate of 40 per-
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cent” (Linthicum n.d., p. 2). Similarly, in a 2011 report issued by the McKinsey Global 
Institue, it was projected that there was a shortage of “140,000 to 190,000 people with 
deep analytical skills as well as 1.5 million managers and analysts with the know-how to 
use the analysis of big data to make effective decisions” (Manyika et al., 2011). This 
atmosphere has led academic programs in library and information science to unroll 
new programs in data analytics and ramp up current enrollment in courses in areas 
such as data-mining and text-mining. In a broad range of industries and academic fields 
– from advertising to medicine to the humanities – people are employing analytical 
techniques like data mining and text mining in hopes of tapping into the secrets locked 
within big data. This drive to capitalize on big data stems from the belief that it is within 
big data that future prosperity lies; the McKinsey report mentioned above claimed that 
“The amount of data in our world has been exploding, and analyzing large data sets – 
so-called big data – will become a key basis of competition, underpinning new waves of 
productivity growth, innovation, and consumer surplus” (2011). The underlying belief 
here is that if this data is managed and manipulated properly, we will have new and 
more powerful means of accessing new forms of knowledge, capital, and even truth. If 
any single phenomena can be said to describe the current moment, there is arguably 
none better than “data”. 
As an industry and academic concern, big data has exploded in recent years. In 
addition to these sectors, state agencies have also jumped on the big data bandwagon, 
integrating big data techniques into existing surveillance practices and implementing 
entirely new surveillance regimes based primarily on these methods. The ability to 
capture and analyze such vast quantities of information about people – innocent and 
guilty alike – fundamentally changes the practice and role of surveillance in our society. 
Below I describe a number of new surveillance practices that bring together new media 
technologies with the techniques of data analysis and show how these systems cannot 
easily be folded into the Big Brother narrative of surveillance. 
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The data-rich social spaces emerging from our use of technologies like mobile 
ICTs and social networking services expand the possibilities of surveillance, both 
facilitating new monitoring techniques and extending previously existing strategies. As 
Mark Andrejevic points out, “Within the digital enclosure, the movements and activities 
of individuals equipped with interactive devices become increasingly transparent – and 
this makes monitoring technologies easier to obtain and use.” (2007, p. 212). This system 
of distributed surveillance blends existing logics and technologies of monitoring with 
new ones and constitutes a mode of surveillance different in form, function, and 
purpose than previously existing modalities. Unsurprisingly, state entitites are actively 
pursuing distributed surveillance strategies as a means of strengthening and expanding 
existing surveillance regimes. 
Government entities at the national, state, and municipal levels are increasingly 
relying on distributed surveillance strategies as a means of monitoring and collecting 
intelligence. For example, where police agencies once had to rely on court-granted 
warrants to conduct wiretaps of suspects’ telephones, they can now submit information 
requests directly to cellphone service providers, giving them immediate access to 
information that would have otherwise required significant amounts of bureaucracy 
and labor to collect (Lichtblau 2012a, 2012b). Requests for subscriber information from 
federal agencies and city police departments, both, have been increasing rapidly since 
the early 2000s. In 2012, mobile carriers reported that they responded to over 1.3 
million requests for subscriber information from law enforcement agencies, an increase 
of about fifteen percent from the previous year. In fulfillment of these requests, mobile 
carriers handed over information such as the content of text messages and the location 
information of individual handsets. While these numbers seem high, it is likely that the 
raw number of subscribers whose data was handed over to the authorities is even higher 
than this data would suggest. Incomplete reporting practices and the fact that a single 
request from the police will often include user data for multiple subscribers mean that 
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the numbers reported by service providers likely fail to capture the extent to which 
customer information is being accessed by police and security agencies (2012a). 
Stingray devices are another example of how police are bypassing traditional 
routes of legal authority to access personal cell phone data (Fakhoury & Timm, 2012). 
Stingrays operate by masquerading as cellphone towers, tricking cellphones into 
connecting to them and subsequently offering up their information. When a cellphone 
comes within range of the Stingray, it links to the device and sends it the information it 
would normally provide a cell phone tower, even if it is not being used to make a phone 
call at the time. From these brief connections a variety of information can be gleaned 
from the cellphone: its unique identifying information, its location, the time and 
destination of phone calls, and in certain cases, even the content of conversations or text 
messages (Higgins & Timm, 2013). Police agencies collect and store this data, providing 
them with an accurate picture of who was in the vicinity of a given Stingray at a certain 
point in time, a useful resource when trying to solve a crime in the area. But the Stingray 
is unable to discern cellphones of criminals from those of innocent civilians, and so 
these “fishing expeditions” for cellphone data, much like the “data dumps” provided by 
mobile service providers, place vast numbers of citizens under an opaque and secretive 
form of surveillance. This secrecy makes it difficult for citizens to resist or intervene into 
these monitoring regimes, providing state authorities with a disproportionate amount of 
power. And because they are being carried out in an extra-legal space outside of the 
courts, they are few checks in place to ensure these techniques are not being used 
inappropriately. 
Police agencies aren’t relying only on the services and technologies provided by 
private companies to enact these new surveillance practices; various agencies are 
seeking to implement their own brand of data-driven surveillance, often partnering 
with the private sector to develop new surveillance technologies. In August 2012, a set of 
stolen emails was published on Wikileaks detailing the workings of a surveillance 
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system named Trapwire (Arthur 2012). Developed in 2004 by Abraxas, an intelligence 
and security firm founded by ex-CIA agents, the documents described Trapwire as a 
distributed surveillance system that utilized information collected from networks of 
CCTV cameras, license plate scanners, and facial recognition and linking these to data 
analysis and pattern recognition software to detect suspicious behavioral patterns as a 
means of preventing future terrorist attacks. This system integrated already existing 
surveillance technologies and techniques with cutting edge data analytics to identify 
suspicious behavior that could indicate of potential terrorist activity. Evidence in the 
Wikileaks documents showed that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security had paid 
$832,000 to set up Trapwire in Washington D.C. and Seattle, but although Trapwire was 
tested in both cities, the Department of Homeland Security has said that it was not 
convinced of its effectiveness and that it ended trials in both locations in 2011 (Arthur 
2012; Shane 2012b). Nonetheless, Trapwire is a potent example of how police initiatives 
are beginning to capitalize on new media technologies and data analysis in combination 
with existing monitoring technologies to widen their surveillance and information-
gathering capabilities. 
While it’s unclear whether Trapwire ever saw widespread adoption, the trend is 
toward the incorporation of big data and new media into institutional surveillance 
strategies. Police departments, city governments, and federal organizations like the FBI 
and NSA are moving to integrate data-driven strategies into their existing surveillance 
practices. A surveillance network similar to Trapwire was activated in New York City in 
2012 that connects existing monitoring infrastructure including CCTV cameras with 
cutting edge data analytics. In August 2012, Mayor Bloomberg announced the release of 
the Domain Awareness System (DAS), a software-powered surveillance system that 
capitalizes on the 3,000 or so already existing NYPD and privately-operated CCTV 
cameras throughout the city (Office of the Mayor 2012). Developed in partnership with 
Microsoft, the DAS connects these camera feeds with software that is able to “cross-check 
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criminal and terrorist databases, take radiation levels, scan license plates, and more – 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week” (Coscarelli 2012). This system can access vast amounts of 
information about people in mere seconds – both criminals and the general public – 
allowing for “deep, granular analysis of crime patterns in real time” (Ungerleider 2012). 
The DAS was ostensibly implemented to combat future terrorist attacks, but while 
allowing the NYPD to monitor potential terrorist activities, it also provides them with 
the ability to secretly monitor and police the activities of normal people. While the DAS 
is meant to prevent terrorist attacks, it does so only by putting vast numbers of New 
York City residents under a vast system of real-time, fine-grained monitoring. And even 
though the DAS is not secret, it is unlikely that normal residents of New York City fully 
understand the extent to which their movements, activities, and communications are 
being monitored by their local police and government. 
Trapwire, Stingrays, and the DAS all exemplify the ways that institutional 
authorities are incorporating new data-driven technologies and techniques into 
previously existing surveillance regimes, usually enhancing state power. But while they 
utilize a variety of high-tech means, these systems do not represent a paradigm shift but 
rather a fortification and extension of the means and logics that already exist. Databases, 
phone-taps, and security cameras are far from novel, and while the techniques have 
been enhanced through new information and communications technologies, the 
technologies described above are all in line with the logic of already existing 
surveillance systems: watch people, record their behavior, and intervene if things 
appear awry.  
For organizations like the NSA, the CIA, the FBI, and Britain’s GCHQ 
(Government Communications Headquarters), the ascendent area of data analytics is 
where the future of security and surveillance really lies (See Bamford 2012, Kelley 2013, 
and Seffers 2013). So important is data thought to be by these organizations, at a 
conference in March 2013, Chief Technology Officer for the CIA Ira Hunt stated that one 
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of the agency’s aims is to, “to collect everything and hang onto it forever” (Webster 2013). 
Describing people as “walking sensor platform[s]”, he illustrated just how sophisticated 
their data-driven monitoring techniques had becoming, explaining that “somebody can 
know where you are at all times because you carry a mobile device, even if that mobile 
device is turned off” (Kelley 2013). And it isn’t just the unique identifying information of 
the phone’s hardware that gives us away: “based on the sensors in a smartphone, 
someone can be identified (with 100 percent accuracy) by the way they walk — implying 
that someone could be identified even when carrying someone else's phone” (2013). 
Similarly, the NSA is so invested in the potential of big data that it has 
undertaken a $2 billion project building a complex in the isolated mountains of Utah for 
the sole purpose of information monitoring and collecting via data analysis (Sternstein 
2012). As reported in Wired magazine by James Bamford, the purpose of this project 
would be “to intercept, decipher, analyze, and store vast swaths of the world’s 
communications as they zap down from satellites and zip through the underground and 
undersea cables of international, foreign, and domestic networks” (2012). In a similar 
venture, the UK’s GCHQ is tackling the vast amounts of data produced by our social 
networking activities as a potential source of intelligence: 
The [GCHQ’s] secretive listening post plans to use the algorithms to help its 
surveillance systems make sense of human language, training its 
computers to automatically identify "valuable intelligence" within huge 
troves of intercepted data. This will enhance the agency's ability to pick out 
keywords and phrases from phone calls and emails as they are passing 
over networks in near real-time, enabling government spies to "find 
meaningful patterns and relationships" between people deemed a threat, 
such as suspected terrorists (Gallagher 2012). 
These projects are costly and labor-intensive, but the scope of the monitoring they seek 
to implement is breathtaking. They illustrate the immense power of data-driven 
102 
 
surveillance techniques and the absolute faith governments in the West appear to have 
placed in them.  
No new service is more indicative of this shift in surveillance strategies by state 
authorities than the tracking software RIOT. The existence of RIOT – Rapid Information 
Overlay Technology – was uncovered in early February, 2013, when James Ball reported 
in The Guardian about a video demonstrating its frightening capabilities (2013). 
Referred to sarcastically as the “Google for spies” (Gayle 2013), RIOT was developed by 
multinational defense company Raytheon and capitalizes on the information uploaded 
to various social networking sites (SNS) to track people – deemed “objects” in the context 
of the software – with frightening efficiency. In the words of a Raytheon spokesperson, 
“RIOT is a big data analytics system… [that] turn[s] massive amounts of data into useable 
information to help meet our nation's rapidly changing security needs” (Gallagher 
2013). Unsurprisingly, this novel use of big data techniques (and potential violation of 
personal privacy) is being carried out in the name of national security. As James Ball 
points out: 
The ‘big data’ theory works like this: by grabbing hundreds or thousands 
of datapoints on millions of people, we build a systematic picture of how 
everyday people act. By analyzing these by machine for ‘outliers’, or 
suspicious activity, we can catch the bad guys (2013). 
In the video demonstration dated November 2010, a Raytheon employee walks 
viewers through the various capabilities of the RIOT software. Aggregating information 
scraped from multiple social networking services, the demonstration begins with RIOT 
collecting photographs of the target individual that he has made publicly available on 
the web and, using location information stored in the image’s EXIF data, plotting them 
on a map for easy viewing by the user.15 Location information is also gleaned from the 
                                                
15 EXIF data refers to information about the image – the camera settings, date and time, and a 
variety of other data including latitude and longitude if the image was taken with a GPS-capable 
device as most smartphones are – that is automatically embedded within digital image itself and 
that follows it wherever the image may travel on the web unless it is actively removed. 
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target’s status updates on sites 
like Facebook and location 
check-ins using services like 
Four Square. Using this data, 
RIOT is able not only to show 
visually where a person has 
been, but also provides 
predictions as to where they 
will be at given point in time 
on a given day by using the 
predictive capacity of data 
analytics.  
By the time the video hits the two-minute mark, RIOT has already provided 
multiple images collected from Facebook of the target as well as a map showing his 
movements over the last few months. Built into the system is a “top places analytic” that 
provides the Raytheon user with a pie chart showing the most common locations where 
an individual checks in as well as the most common times of day and days of the week at 
which they do so. Highlighting both the power and creepiness of the software, at this 
point the presenter adds, “So if you ever did want to try to get hold of Nick, or maybe get 
a hold of his laptop, you might want to visit the gym at 6 am on Monday” (Gallagher 
2013). 
Graphical and geographic data are collected about the object through its various 
social networking activities. But RIOT also has a “Graphical RIOT Object Browser” that 
generates a graphical web visualizing a person’s connections to other individuals. In 
public online communications (e.g., shout-outs on Twitter, posts on public Facebook 
walls), people mention other individuals’ names and also connect to other data objects 
Figure 10: The RIOT map display showing the recent 
movements of the target. 
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like phone numbers and email 
addresses. This capability 
provides RIOT users a way to 
visualize the connections 
between different people and 
different types of data. 
RIOT differs from other 
modes of distributed 
surveillance in eschewing 
traditional monitoring 
technologies like cameras and 
wiretaps: it is an entirely data-
driven mode of surveillance. And the data it uses to create these constructed identities 
come not from opaque databases surreptitiously compiled by secretive companies or 
government security agencies but from the information we willingly – even 
enthusiastically – provide to social networking services. In the demonstration of RIOT, 
the presenter pulls data from four services: Facebook, Foursquare, Twitter, and 
Gowalla.16 In the years since the production of the video, social networking has grown 
explosively with ascendant new services like Instagram and Tumblr gaining 
prominence, especially amongst users of mobile ICTs. These applications collect and 
publish text, photos, and location data in ways similar to the services discussed in the 
video. With the continued evolution of products available in the SNS landscape, the 
increased numbers of SNS users across all demographics, the concomitant increase in 
the amount of personal data being uploaded, and the (presumedly) continued 
refinement of its search algorithms, it seems a safe assumption that RIOT, if it has not 
already been surpassed by other software, will have grown in both power and efficiency 
                                                
16 Gowalla was a location-based SNS similar to Foursquare that allowed users to “check-in” at 
various locations; it launched in 2007 but closed in 2012. 
Figure 11: RIOT’s “Graphical RIOT Object Browser” showing 
social links between the target and other individuals. Names 
were blurred out in the video to protect people’s identities. 
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since the video was made in 2010. The brief demonstration is disconcerting at it is, but it 
should be noted that at no time is it suggested that the sophisticated techniques 
demonstrated in the video constitute the entirety of RIOT’s monitoring capabilities. In 
short, who knows what else this type of software can do?  
With negligible effort, RIOT users can access vast amounts of highly detailed 
personal information about almost anybody. The demonstrator in the video compiles 
small bits of information from a host of sources that, in the aggregate, provide him with 
a startlingly accurate portrait of his target and the ability to predict his movements in 
space. All the while that he is doing this, he exhibits the same sense of scandalous 
pleasure that one gets from “stalking” somebody on Facebook. Further, his casual and 
playful use of RIOT, coupled with the user friendly graphical interface, frames this novel 
mode of surveillance as no more serious an activity than looking at someone’s 
Instagram pictures or reading their Twitter feed: state surveillance as online time-
waster. One could just as easily be playing minesweeper. The ease with which personal 
data is proffered by RIOT makes monitoring of the public seem casual and harmless. 
The result is that surveillance, once something vigorously opposed by those subjected to 
it, becomes normalized and domesticated; just another part of the contemporary data 
landscape and of daily life in general. 
While one can hope that only the “bad guys” are being tracked via RIOT, no 
technical limitations or legal regulations prevent its users from shifting its focus from 
suspected terrorists and to normal citizens. RIOT’s ease of use and similarity to 
contemporary social networking-based leisure activities allows its users to bypass or not 
even consider many of the cultural, legal, and technical hurdles that, in the past, made 
surveillance difficult to carry out. But by making it so easy to monitor almost anyone, 
RIOT promotes an ideology of a priori criminality wherein everyone becomes a suspect 
and all are guilty until proven innocent.  
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Like Stingrays, Trapwire, and the DAS, RIOT exemplifies the ways in which the 
contemporary explosion of data and the refinement of personal media technologies are 
being integrated into existing regimes of surveillance. But what differentiates RIOT from 
those other systems is that it is predicated not upon widespread, un-targeted monitoring 
of the public, but upon specific informational practices and behaviors we partake in, 
often as forms of leisure. Granted, RIOT will only be as effective as the information 
available to it, something at least partially in our control as users of these SNS, but so is a 
surveillance camera only able to capture those who step in front of it. RIOT’s use of 
freely provided user data signals a significant transformation in the nature of 
contemporary surveillance practices. 
New surveillance techniques are used by the state, but citizens have increasing 
access to such means of distributed surveillance. In turn, the power operations of 
surveillance are also changing. Like government and police entities, the surveillance 
capabilities of the average citizen have been bolstered by emerging data and 
information technologies. The proliferation of networked ICTs allows widespread 
adoption of surveillance strategies by the public that were once used exclusively by the 
state. With these technologies, people become more visible within existing fields of 
surveillance, yet become increasingly capable agents of surveillance themselves. 
Empowered by the technical capabilities of personal ICTs, citizens can turn their 
surveillant gaze upon those in positions of traditional authority: police, politicians, and 
corporate executives, among others. At the same time, animated by a growing 
participation in social media and its ethos of over-sharing, they can also monitor the 
various goings on of their peers through services like Facebook, Tumblr, and Instagram.  
Both state and corporate surveillance are perceived to emanate from above onto 
those below – the French roots of the word literally mean to watch (veiller) from above 
(sur) – the everyday surveillance by average citizens operates differently. The explosion 
of citizen surveillance via ICTs to capture the misdeeds of authority figures illustrates a 
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seeming reversal of the traditional role of surveillance in a practice referred to as “sous-
veillance” (sous meaning “below” in French) (Mann et al., 2003). In a 2008 incident, a 
rookie NYPD police officer was captured by a tourist’s video camera as he tackled a 
cyclist in the middle of Times Square during a Critical Mass event, a monthly bicycle 
rally held in cities across the country (Dwyer 2008). In the video, posted on YouTube 
shortly after the incident (GDragon9666 2008), Officer Patrick Pogan is seen lunging at a 
passing cyclist, driving his body into the cyclist and throwing him from his bike onto the 
street below. The cyclist, Christopher Long, was then arrested by Pogan and held for 26 
hours on charges of attempted assault and disorderly conduct. In Pogan’s own report, he 
cast himself as the victim of an unprovoked attack by Long, suggesting that the cyclist 
had been weaving haphazardly through traffic and forcing multiple vehicles to veer or 
stop abruptly to avoid hitting him. In contrast, the video shows Pogan rapidly moving 
into Long’s path and deliberately body-checking him from his bicycle, all on a street 
where no cars are visible at all.  
New York Times reporter Jim Dwyer summarized the event as a case of “official 
truth collid[ing] with cheap digital technology” (2008). Arguing that the proliferation of 
affordable media technologies like video cameras and smartphones challenge the 
traditional production of history, Dwyer suggests that these technologies are ushering in 
an era of “free range history” in which public accounts of events stand on equal footing 
with official narratives. In traditional history, official narratives would go unchallenged. 
Dwyer’s story illustrates the tendency to valorize mobile ICTs as empowering and 
democratizing surveillance technologies. They are seen as providing citizens with tools 
to resist institutional power and its monopoly on the official record, upsetting 
established authority and power structures. 
Framed as providing a means of resisting established power and disseminated 
throughout popular culture as seductive visual spectacles for mainstream media 
audiences, occurrences of sous-veillance have received significant cultural visibility. But 
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above and below are not the only directions toward which the surveillant gaze can be 
directed; increasingly, it is to the sides, toward those we consider peers – friends, family 
members, and co-workers – that we turn this gaze. Social networking services like 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram induce users to divulge personal information about 
themselves. In this media environment, user information – music and movie 
preferences, photographs, hometowns, alma maters, current places of employment, and 
demographic data like age, race, sexual orientation, gender, and relationship status – is 
consumed as content by other users and makes peer surveillance possible. 
Communications scholar Mark Andrejevic and others refer to this mode of peer 
monitoring as “lateral surveillance” (2006). Practices of lateral surveillance are unique in 
that they simultaneously situate people in the position of both watcher and watched. As 
people upload pictures, make connections with friends, update their locations, provide 
details about where they work, who they are dating, and where they went to school, they 
place themselves within new fields of social visibility while simultaneously monitoring 
others. 
It could be argued that lateral surveillance practices replace Big Brother with a 
multiplying number of Little Brothers. But lateral surveillance does not simply replace 
the punitive top-down gaze of Big Brother. Instead, it encourages everyday citizens to 
replicate and internalize the governmental logics behind contemporary surveillance 
practices. The internalization of the surveillant gaze is in part the same as the 
disciplinary surveillance of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, a model of prison 
surveillance analyzed at in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975/1995). Having been 
subjected to the discontinuous watch of the warden, prisoners in the panopticon come 
to internalize the panoptic gaze, enacting the power of surveillance upon themselves as 
a means of regulating their own behavior. This ensures they fall in line with established 
standards and expectations of conduct.  
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But lateral surveillance also signals the internalization of the governmental logics 
of risk management, efficiency, and productivity. Although the proliferation of 
consumer surveillance technologies breaks down the state monopoly on the means of 
surveillance, a simple narrative of accelerating technological development and adoption 
cannot account for the emergence and impact of lateral surveillance practices. Instead, 
as Andrejevic points out, the growth in technologies and techniques of surveillance 
needs to be understood in a cultural and political climate of “generalized, redoubled 
risk” that is characteristic of neoliberal forms of governance (2005, p. 493). This is more 
in line with Foucault’s notion of governmentality in which people are encouraged to 
become self-governing subjects through an array of social, cultural, and material 
technologies to modify and work-on their selves (Foucault 1982/2000). As discussed in 
the previous chapter, governmentality seeks to shape conduct not by force or coercion 
but by working on people’s motivations, beliefs, and values. Operating from a distance, 
governmentality achieves legitimacy by appealing to people’s freedom of choice and 
perceived autonomy; it is a de-centered mode of power in which people are induced to 
enact governing power upon themselves and in the process constitute themselves as 
good citizen-subjects. In her study of biometric technologies, Kelly Gates argues that 
“online social networking is a new site of social regulation and government, where users 
offer up personal information about themselves to friends, strangers, and other 
interested parties, while simultaneously participating in monitoring the lives of others” 
(2011, p. 146). The lateral surveillance conducted through these technologies provides 
people with tools for monitoring self and other as a means of risk management and self-
maximization, in turn allowing them to more effectively govern themselves. 
To what extend have surveillance activities become engrained in the fabric of 
contemporary life? As I have been suggesting, the technological conveniences often 
double as forms of monitoring. Credit cards, passports, and even registration of our new 
laptops and other devices all contribute to the ever-expanding mesh of surveillance that 
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makes contemporary life possible. Without many of these, negotiating everyday 
challenges would be inconvenient and inefficient. Moreover, in order to partake in 
contemporary society, we are obligated to submit ourselves to myriad regimes of 
distributed surveillance being conducted by countless agents including police, 
commercial enterprises, and employers. But though they may be difficult to avoid, 
contemporary distributed surveillance regimes are not forced upon us like the 
oppressive gaze of Big Brother, nor are we coerced into providing the social networking 
services with the personal data utilized by systems like RIOT. By using these 
technologies, we voluntarily place ourselves within these systems as targets for 
surveillance, even if we do so ignorant of how it is being conducted. We could, we are 
told, simply choose not to use them.  
We could refuse to partake in these systems – pay for everything with cash, set 
our web browsers to restrict tracking, unsubscribe from Facebook and LinkedIn and 
Instagram – but opting out of all the systems that track us daily is effectively impossible. 
The suggestion that we could simply choose not to be monitored rests on the freedom of 
choice that has been constructed at the heart of neoliberal governmentality. Since we 
willingly use these services and technologies, we are choosing to place ourselves under 
surveillance; we could always choose to remove ourselves through non-participation. 
But even partial non-participation is difficult to achieve since these systems are so often 
opaque or obligatory if we are to enjoy the benefits of an advanced society (try driving 
without a driver’s license or getting mobile phone service without a Social Security 
Number). Increasingly, willing submission to surveillance systems originating from 
multiple sources is an implicit condition of citizenship in modern society. Thus we 
become subjugated through a belief that we are enacting an innate free will in our 
decision to use these technologies when in reality we are carrying out the internalized 
goals of governmental power. 
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The deployment of wide-reaching data-driven surveillance strategies by state 
entities may seem, at first glance, very much in line with the explanatory mythology of 
Big Brother. But this narrative doesn’t capture the complexity of contemporary 
surveillance. Indeed, it draws attention away from other, less visible, modes of 
surveillance fueled by the explosion of big data and proliferation of consumer 
surveillance technologies, methods that have become throughly engrained in society 
and whose effects are far from insignificant. The Big Brother mythology directs both our 
attention and our anxieties toward a fantastical and pat construction of a tyrannical 
centralized state, guilty of over-reaching its authority, and draws attention away from 
those surveillance practices and power operations – co-veillance, sous-veillance, self-
surveillance – that cannot so easily be traced back to or explained away by this 
convenient narrative.  
In addition to Big Brother, Foucault’s account of Jeremy Benthem’s panopticon is 
another way in which surveillance is often understood both in mainstream culture and 
academic scholarship (1975/1995). As a tool of disciplinary power the panopticon 
described a design for prisons in which the prisoners’ cell were organized around a 
central viewing post from which guards could watch inmates without their knowledge. 
Never knowing when they were being watched, inmates would come to internalize the 
surveilling gaze of the guard, allowing for the operation of power in the absence of force 
or violence. The primary effect of the panopticon, then, was “to induce in the inmate a 
state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power” (1975/1995, p. 201). In this way they came to be disciplined. While panopticism 
seemingly shares many things with Big Brother including the perpetual gaze of 
authority over the surveilled and the use of the visibility of the surveillance apparatus as 
a means of governing conduct, Foucault’s account the panopticon differs in its 
mechanisms of action and its effects from Orwell’s Big Brother. For Orwell, power 
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functions only for the purposes of domination. As it is explained by O’Brien, an agent of 
the thought police:  
The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake… Power is not a means, it is 
an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a 
revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. 
The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. 
The object of power is power (Orwell 1949/2003, p. 338). 
In contrast, the power operations of panopticism are much more nuanced. The 
panoptic gaze is not deployed in the pursuit of dominance, instead it functions to 
produce discipline and normalization. Through the internalization of surveillance, 
people enact panoptic power upon themselves, ensuring that their conduct falls within 
acceptable limits, that they are “normal”. Indeed, the ultimate aim of disciplinary power 
is that it is able operate in the absence of force. Under the threat of constant surveillance, 
individuals take on the “responsibility for the constraints of power… mak[ing] the play 
of power spontaneously upon [themselves]” (Foucault 1975/1995, p. 202). Never 
knowing when we are or are not being watched, we behave in compliance with 
established norms of conduct. Conversely, for Big Brother, power is nothing but force. 
Where Big Brother relies upon the coercive power of state authority and 
punishment to ensure proper conduct of citizens through the use of perpetual 
surveillance and propaganda, the systems of surveillance of the control society function 
significantly differently. As Communications scholar James Wong points out, “fear is 
central to the operation of Orwell’s Big Brother system, within which fear of physical 
and psychological punishment motivates people to conform” (2001, p. 39). While certain 
types of fear act to shape conduct within disciplinary societies, it is not the fear of 
violence but the fear of exclusion, of falling outside the boundaries of what is considered 
normal, that govern disciplinary subjects. So unlike Big Brother which shapes conduct 
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through terror, disciplinary forms of surveillance shape conduct through the 
internalization of the monitoring gaze by those who fall within its field of vision.  
Although contemporary surveillance regimes employ perpetual system of 
monitoring, their primary function is neither domination as it is in the form of Big 
Brother nor discipline as it is embodied in the panopticon. Clearly, these data-drive 
practices are not without disciplinary effects – the awareness that our digital activities 
may be monitored will have normalizing effects on technology users to at least a limited 
extent – but control through normalization is the not primary goal of tactics like the 
DAS or RIOT. These systems signal a novel surveillance rationality and an expanded 
role for surveillance in society.  
Distributed modes of surveillance operate through the collection of countless bits 
of disparate data about people. By storing this information and linking it to already 
existing databases, authorities are able to cobble together virtual representations of 
people. Stored in databases, these representations of us are referred to by philosopher 
Gilles Deleuze as “dividuals;” partial constructions of our identities that are endlessly 
mutable and mobile (1997, p. 295). As these vast databases of personal information held 
by both state and commercial entities are linked together, these “dividuals” or “data-
selves” move smoothly amongst them, through borders that were previously solid, 
aggregating more information and resulting in ever more accurate digital 
representations of us. Solove suggests that these systems operate like a “Seurat painting, 
where a multitude of dots juxtaposed together form a picture, bits of information when 
aggregated paint a portrait of a person” (2004, p. 44). The surveillant element of these 
systems emerges not through the constant gaze of an observer, but instead through the 
triangulation of various data-points about a person. A pioneer in the field of 
surveillance studies, David Lyon argues that “a centralized surveillance system – the 
archetypal modern fear – is unnecessary when data-bases are networked. Any one of a 
number of identifiers will suffice to trace your location or activities” (2003, p. 168). 
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The move toward data-based systems of surveillance was not a deliberate choice 
made by a centralized authority. In contrast, it emerged organically by the actions of “a 
group of different actors with different purposes attempting to thrive in an increasingly 
information-based society” (Solove 2004, p. 34). The innovation of contemporary 
surveillance regimes, then, isn’t in their adoption of data collection and analysis as 
much as it is their linking of the numerous, partial, databases already in existence in 
both public and private realms. As RIOT demonstrates, it is by linking disparate data 
sets that modern forms of surveillance operate so effectively. 
The emergence of “risk” as an organizing logic of political and social life under 
neoliberalism has had a shaping effect on contemporary surveillance systems. The 
increased profile of this logic promotes a model of surveillance that is oriented less 
toward issues of detection, control and punishment of aberrant conduct and more 
toward the calculation, management, and avoidance of risk. David Lyon argues that the 
adoption of an actuarial approach to surveillance has shifted the priorities of 
contemporary monitoring regimes: 
Police and private security services today are concerned less to apprehend 
criminals after the fact than to anticipate criminal behaviors, classify them 
on a risk calculus, and contain or preempt them… Moral wrongdoing 
seems pushed to the edge of the picture as has… the discovery and 
bringing to justice of lawbreakers (2003, p. 170). 
If, previously, the goal of surveillance was to prevent misconduct through the 
internalization of discipline, the goal of distributed surveillance is to prevent 
misconduct through the predictive potential of perfect knowledge. By shifting focus 
from “what you did” to “what you will do,” the actions of a person, population, or society 
become calculable and predictable. No longer is surveillance enacted for the purposes of 
catching suspected villains; instead, these techniques are deployed with the aim of 
predicting certain events and preventing them before they occur. 
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Because of this change in orientation, in response to accusations of domestic 
spying, President Obama can truthfully say, “No one is listening to your phone calls” 
(Pearson 2013). While the digital traces of our communications constitute the fodder for 
data-based surveillance regimes, the content of those communications isn’t needed for 
them to function. The information being gathered is innocuous on its own and the 
majority of people likely wouldn’t be particularly bothered to know a state agency was 
keeping track of who they’re phoning, the websites they’re visiting, or even their 
geographical movement.17  
The fractured pieces of data collected by these systems in isolation say little about 
the people they reference; to many this data collection doesn’t constitute a violation of 
privacy. Through such perceptions, these systems de-individualize the subjects they 
monitor. Instead of being unique, each of us becomes a calculable data point. The 
information being collected doesn’t represent “me” in the same way my image on a 
video does and in turn these surveillance systems feel distant and disconnected from my 
life. Because of this, people are likely to respond to news of distributed surveillance 
regimes like blogger and journalist Kyle Wagner: “I am unimportant, on a practical and 
metaphysical level. So are you, probably. And so is absolutely everything any of us do on 
the internet. No one gives a shit about our information” (2013). This is a variant of the “If 
you have nothing to hide…” argument often used to justify or disregard distributed 
surveillance regimes. This is an effective argument because it frames surveillance as a 
trade off between a trivial invasion of privacy and a significant enhancement to security, 
whether this is actually the case or not. It also suggests privacy to be nothing more than 
secrecy and that the only thing someone would want kept private would be something 
unlawful or otherwise wrong. But as anyone caught getting dressed in front of an open 
window will attest, there are a vast number of things that are far from being considered 
wrong but that we would rather remain private nonetheless. As RIOT demonstrates, the 
                                                
17 Evidence of this can be seen in a 2013 Pew poll indicating that 56% of Americans are 
comfortable with the NSA collecting their cell phone metadata when its framed as a means of 
preventing terrorism (Pew Research Center 2013). 
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disparate bits of data collected through these surveillance practices constitute a 
powerful means of identifying, monitoring, and tracking individuals. But because the 
information being collected appears trivial or because the trade-offs seem reasonable, 
these systems are difficult to oppose.  
In contrast to the Big Brother model that seeks domination and the panopticon 
that seeks normalization, the prioritization of data in these distributed surveillance 
systems constitutes an entirely different set of rationales and priorities for surveillance. 
Their emergence signals the transformation of surveillance from a disciplinary 
mechanism into a tactic of calculating and managing risk. 
Orwell’s 1984 is a terrifying account of state power gone too far. As a metaphor it 
has had enduring significance in Western societies, shaping our understanding of 
surveillance and functioning as a cautionary tale against state tyranny. Because Big 
Brother is a metaphor it is perhaps easy to dismiss it as a fanciful creation with little 
significance the goings on of the real world. But the importance of these types of 
representations shouldn’t be downplayed. By establishing a terrain of meaning upon 
which to make sense of our world, metaphors play an important role in shaping the 
ways in which we understand our experiences and the world surrounding us. They 
promote certain ways of understanding while suppressing others, and because of this 
play an important role in the constitution of reality. Given the dominance of the Big 
Brother mythology in shaping our understanding of surveillance and power, it’s 
important to properly account for the role and significance of surveillance in 
contemporary society. 
The surveillance practices described in this chapter – Trapwire, Stingrays, DAS, 
and Riot – all contribute to the consolidation of state power through data-driven 
surveillance strategies. Understandably, then, the Big Brother mythology of surveillance 
is often employed to make sense of the mechanisms of action as well as the power 
operations working behind these new practices even though they employ new tools and 
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techniques of computerized data collection and analysis. This framework for 
understanding contemporary forms of surveillance – an act carried out surreptitiously 
by a powerful centralized state-like entity upon its citizens as a means of policing 
behavior and consolidating power – is present throughout popular culture, ensuring its 
continued predominance as an explanatory narrative used to make sense of these types 
of monitoring behavior. Accordingly, at multiple sites of representation, we can see 
these new forms of data-driven surveillance practices being folded into the explanatory 
mythology of Big Brother. 
The adoption of new surveillance techniques by police and state organizations 
represents an expansion and transformation of government surveillance strategies. But 
the advanced capabilities of personal ICTs coupled with their rapid uptake has led to a 
growth in surveillance carried out not just by the state, but by various entities – 
corporations, advertisers, and even private citizens. The Big Brother mythology 
downplays and overlooks the proliferating modes of surveillance and their complicated 
relations to power in our society in favor of a conventional and simplistic representation 
of surveillance as a tool of centralized state power. 
But the proliferation and diffusion of the means of surveillance have made 
surveillance a central and complex feature of contemporary social relations, existing at 
multiple sites throughout the social field. This complexity, and the growth of modalities 
of surveillance other than top-down model of domination, are not captured by the 
convenient mythology of Big Brother. By promoting this narrow and simplistic 
conception of surveillance, the Big Brother narrative draws attention away from the 
other ways in which practices of surveillance figure into contemporary structures of 
power and governance. Specifically, the Big Brother narrative overlooks the complex 
multidirectionality of surveillance practices and technologies as they are taken up by 
normal citizens and the ways in which surveillance has transformed from a means of 
monitoring conduct to a strategy or risk-calculation and avoidance. 
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Where the Big Brother narrative suggests that surveillance functions only as a 
tool of the state to monitor and oppress its subjects, practices of sous-veillance and 
lateral surveillance, while by no means inherently empowering or democratizing, show 
that surveillance has myriad functions and has taken on myriad meanings – control, 
oppressions, domination but also resistance, innovation, and pleasure. By framing the 
state as the sole agent of oppressive surveillance, Big Brother narratives elide the 
complexity of today’s multiple modalities of surveillance. 
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Conclusion 
Using the analytical frameworks of technoculture and assemblage, I have sought 
to show that technology plays a significant role in our constitution as subjects as well as 
in shaping our identities, our experience of space, our relationship to artifacts, and our 
understanding of power. While each chapter in this study stands alone, they share a 
number of concerns.  
In “Queering the Master’s Tools,” I showed that the strategic appropriation of 
technologies was a productive way to constitute queer identities within a 
heteronormative technoculture. I discuss the female condom as an artifact that has been 
appropriated by queer men for use in anal sex. While I agree with Audre Lorde’s view 
that the Master’s House is not the only place to live, that House offers tools, resources, 
and benefits (e.g., official sanction, clinical trials of effectiveness) not to be had 
elsewhere. In the next chapter, “Pink Triangulations,” I more fully explore the nature of 
queer space. I draw on Foucault’s concept of heterotopias to examine Grindr, the leading 
smartphone application for “gay, bi, and curious men” to hook up by using the phones’ 
GPS capacity. Both these chapters argue forcefully that technology cannot be separated 
from culture, that the meaning and nature of space are relevant to the study of 
technology, and that many spaces crucial to gay and lesbian histories have played a 
significant role in forming today’s gay and lesbian movement and concerns. These 
spaces are threatened today, however, by heteronormative interests (e.g., real estate 
development) and, disappointingly, by homonormative disapproval of and 
disassociation from queerness. 
“Freedom Devices,” the third chapter, examines the benefits and costs to 
individuals and society of being “free,” a signature term that pervades today’s neoliberal 
regime. In this economic system, a device like the iPhone is widely promoted and indeed 
widely understood as a “freedom device.” Seeking some balance between iPhone 
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technophilia and technophobia, I do not argue that such freedom represents a false 
(deluded) ideology – but rather that the meaning of “freedom” is not stable or total. 
Rather it must be critically examined in historical, cultural, even economic, and 
certainly political contexts – which today include terrorism. 
In “New Visibilities,” the final chapter, I argue that the ubiquitous Big Brother 
model of citizen surveillance is inadequate, misleading, and outdated for today’s 
complex and imperfectly mapped landscape. Technology makes possible forms of 
surveillance that are top-down, bottom-up (sous-veillance) and lateral. Whether 
addressing Grindr or RIOT, You-Tube or PRISM, the contemporary technocultural 
landscape is one of new types and increasing levels of visibility and emerging forms of 
power that are built upon them.  
Above all, these essays seek to understand technology through the lens of culture. 
The boundaries erected between the categories of technology and culture are artificial 
and strategic; they function to preserve a narrative of technology in which its 
constituent practices, artifacts, and phenomena are granted autonomy, developmental 
inertia, and political neutrality. But technologies do not function this way; they are not 
easily delineated artifacts. Technologies are messy networks of interconnections 
amongst things, thoughts, ideas, bodies, subjects, identities, representations, money, and 
feelings. And the status of a technology is never given or stable, but radically contingent 
upon the various conditions in which it is taken up, interpreted, reconfigured, and 
deployed. Each chapter here attempts to capture this reality from a series of 
perspectives.  
I have also sought to integrate the concerns of media and cultural studies with 
technology studies, in part by looking at representations of technology in popular 
culture. Media are deliberately constructed artifacts emerging from specific social, 
cultural, and historical contexts. Realities represented in popular culture don’t reflect 
the world as it is, but are carefully constructed representations of diverse phenomena—
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the culmination of countless human decisions based on our particular skills, values, 
beliefs, economics, power structures, and social divisions. Television shows, novels, 
films, newspaper articles, comic books, and the internet are only a few of the media that 
we consume daily and that help constitute our culture and the various realities of 
groups and individuals. Popular culture is easy to disregard or malign, yet access to and 
knowledge about “reality” are primarily communicated through the language and 
symbols we encounter daily. Popular culture makes reality comprehensible. Media, with 
its systems of meaning and signifying practices, are one of the leading resources 
through which people make sense of things. 
As a primary site where reality is constituted, it is culture – through language and 
representation – that teaches us what is true or not, what is real or not, and what is 
possible or not. It also helps us understand the roles and manifestations of 
technoscience today. Too often technology, like science and medicine, has been 
approached as apolitical, ahistorical, and non-symbolic – as a “true material base 
generating our merely symbolic superstructure” (Treichler 1999, p. 15). But 
technologies, like everything else, take on and are understood through complex systems 
of meanings that shape the way they are designed, produced, marketed, and ultimately 
used. We understand a given technology in a highly specific way, expecting it to carry 
out a specialized set of functions and, in turn, embody an equally constrained set of 
meanings. But these meanings are not inherent in the artifacts themselves – there is 
nothing innate about a wrench or a rocket that guarantees it will function as it was 
designed to function or be used in the ways we learn that it should be used. Countless 
forces ranging from the economic to the intimate act upon technology to determine the 
meanings it acquires and to shape its role in society and history. Given the symbolic’s 
privileged position as our gateway to the real, the representation of technologies in 
popular culture is amongst the most significant of these forces: it is where meanings are 
introduced, contested, stabilized, or challenged. To examine the cultural life of a 
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technology is to gain a more accurate and more robust understanding of the function 
and significance of these artifacts and practices, as well as the sociotechnical and 
technocultural systems within which they are embedded. 
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